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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3), Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-4-103(2). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Should the Court have granted a new trial after Plaintiffs lost their "deficient" 
legal counsel for the 2nd time and were forced to become Pro Se litigants. This issue was 
preserved by motion and/or objection when denied the motion. 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question based not only on the 
deficiencies of legal council, but did the deficiencies affect the outcome of the trial? State 
v. Winward. 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah Ct.App. 1997), State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 579 
(Utah Ct.App. 1993), State v. Weaver. 2005 UT 49, State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 114. 
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2. Did the lower court commit reversible error when it allowed the Defense to 
illegally overturn the Federal Court ruling of Judge Jenkins1 of March 5,1995 when 
Defendants1 misrepresented correct vacation pay dates, the words "terminate" versus 
"discharge", and through Judge Pat Brian's Memorandum Decision misquoting from the 
BLA (Basic Labor Agreement) Forfeiture Language by stating that the Plaintiffs' were 
"effectively discharge" (Exhibit I, page 11, paragraph 2). 
Standard of Review. This issue presents questions of law which are reviewed for 
correctness. Basic Labor Agreement BLA §12-A-l-b, BLA §12-A-3, UCC §2-106 (3), 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Judge Pat Brian's Memorandum 
Decision (Sept 22,2005), Tony Pickering v. USX Corp. (case no. 87-C-8381 and 
consolidated cases), Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543 (11th Cir. 1993), 
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993). Hill v. Allred. 2001 UT 16 28 P3d 
127L Alexander v. Oklahoma. 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004), Morris v. Wise, 1955 OK 
297, Robinson v. Morrow, 2004 UT App 285, Wells Fargo Bank v. Temple View 
Investments- 2003 UT App 441 82 P.3d 655. 
3. Should the court have corrected its own error when the Defense mislead the 
lower Court into the judicial errors by misrepresenting the accrued 1987 vacation pay as 
accrued 1988 vacation pay? (Reference Exhibit I, J, and C). This issue was preserved 
by motion and/or objection. 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. ERISA, BLA §12-A-3, UCC §2-106. 
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4. Did the lower court commit reversible judicial errors when it dismissed this case 
for Statute of Limitations even though Appellant did not discover the Defendants' made 
misrepresentation to the Court until mid 2006 when Plaintiffs' legal council withdrew, 
(Ref: Exhibit B (pages 39-41) and Exhibit N). 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law pertaining to tolling 
time period under the Discovery Rule which is reviewed for correctness. Hill v. Allred, 
2001 UT 16,28 P.3d 1271, Discovery Rule. 
5. Did the lower court commit judicial errors when it dismissed this case for 
Statute of Limitations in the face of appellee misrepresentations, appellant preservations, 
unresolved material facts, and no party had motioned for Statute of Limitations? 
Additionally, because Statute of Limitations issue had already been won in Pat Brian's 
Memorandum Decision December 5, 2003 (Exhibit D). 
Standard of Review. This issue is a proven fact (see Exhibit D) and review for 
correctness. 
6. Did the lower court commit judicial errors when it dismissed this case for 
Statute of Limitations in the face of its own prior judicial errors of which it had been 
noticed by appellants motions and objections? (Reference Exhibit C). Additionally, the 
history of this case clearly shows that nearly two years of this delay was caused by the 
court's own conflict of interests and deficiencies of Plaintiffs1 counsel. 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. Wells Fargo Bank v. Temple View Investments, 2003 UT App 441 82 P.3d 
3-50 
655 
7. Defendants1 entered unauthenticated inadmissible accounting documents into 
evidence(Exhibit L) in which Plaintiffs filed objections and memorandum in the attempt 
to stop and correct. Should the court have reviewed Plaintiffs1 material issues and 
provided argument time for the motions on these issues instead of ignoring the issues? . 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law pertaining to summary 
judgment when material facts remain in question which is reviewed for correctness. 
Gardner v. County, 2008 UT 6 178 P.3d 893. 
8. Did the lower court commit reversible error when it illegally modified the 
meaning of the Basic Labor Agreement by switching the word "terminate" for the words 
"effectively discharge"? And also when it misinterpreted and then misquoted the vacation 
pay eligibility requirements? And again when it ignored Plaintiffs opposing evidence 
pertaining to BLA § 8-A and 8-B Suspension and Discharge Procedures that absolutely 
prove that Plaintiffs were terminated, but not discharged? 
Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of law pertaining to summary 
judgment when material facts remain in question, of overturning a prior Federal Court 
ruling, and of non-parties modification of the Basic Labor Agreement which is reviewed 
for correctness. Wells Fargo Bank v. Temple View Investments, 2003 UT App 441 82 
P.3d 655. UCC 2-106(3), BLA §12-A-l-b, BLA §12-A-3, BLA § 8-A and 8-B, UCC §2-
106(3). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following relevant statutes, codes, agreements are attached in Addendum A: 
UCC §2-106(3) (Contracts) 
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) §502(a) 
BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeiture clause for vacation pay) 
BLA § 8-A and 8-B (Suspension and Discharge Procedures) 
BLA §12-A-l-b (Vacation Pay Eligibility Requirements) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
We the pro se Plaintiffs appeal from the decisions and judgments of the Third 
District Court in its denying the pro se Plaintiffs a fair chance to plead their case. The 
lower court ignored Plaintiffs objections, motions, and evidence and then unjustly 
dismissed on Statue of Limitations. Plaintiffs were not given opportunity to argue the 
dismissal. There were material issues pending. 
This case was filed on July 30, 2001 and is about Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 
Legal Malpractice (Breach of Contract), Legal Malpractice (Breach of Fiduciary Duty), 
Legal Malpractice (Negligence), Accounting, and Breach of Trust. Specifically, this case 
is about Alan Young's handling of the Pickering v. USXcase, the monies Alan Young 
received in the Picking v. USX case and, why he has not paid the correct award monies 
owed to Plaintiffs from the Pickering v. USX case. This lawsuit questions what Alan 
Young do with the award money and vacation pay in the form of transparent and 
auditable accounting of the source, amount, and distribution. Additionally, this case is 
about lost increased pensions through negligence and fraud as well as unaccounted for 
legal fees. However, Alan Young attempted to turn this case into an argument about 
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whether money was owed at all and has never shown Plaintiffs any true authenticated 
accounting records toward his defense. 
Originally, Plaintiffs1 were not self represented as pro see litigants, but two 
attempts to hire counsel resulted in their attorneys withdrawing from the case. Plaintiffs 
were forced to become pro se litigants in June of 2006. Plaintiffs1 two attorneys failed to 
plead the facts of the case and failed to preserving critical issues. When Plaintiffs 
confronted their attorneys for not performing, the attorneys withdrew from this lawsuit. 
Attorney Alan Young was the lead attorney representing Plaintiffs in a previous 
case of Pickering v. CAST filed on or about April 10, 1987 (RE: CV00838). In the 
Pickering case, Alan Young controlled the distribution of the settlement funds. On or 
about April 2001, while some Plaintiffs were attending a lawsuit of Chamberlain v. 
Young and while listening to the testimony of Judge Scott Daniels on the topic of 
distribution of "slush fimd" monies from the Pickering v. LffiXcase, Plaintiffs discovered 
that Alan Young still owed to Plaintiffs additional award monies, including vacation pay 
from the Pickering case. Plaintiff Chilton communicated with the court on these facts as 
can be seen in Judge Pat Brian's Memorandum Decision (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) 
dated December 5, 2003, (Exhibit D, page 3, paragraph 3 ) and related letters from 
Plaintiff Chilton (Exhibit G). 
In July of 2001, Plaintiffs hired attorney James Haskins to sue attorney Alan 
Young along with the other attorneys who worked with Alan Young on the Pickering v. 
USX case to recover those remaining award monies and in so doing, gave rise to this 
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instant lawsuit. 
On December 16,2001, Alan Young filed a motion to dismiss. On January 2, 
2002, Judge Tyron Medley dismissed this case without prejudice for Attorney Haskins1 
failure to serve papers to Alan Young in the proper time. This case was refiled in 
February 08, 2002 and served on April 16, 2002. The case then stalled in the 4th district 
court in Provo where no judge would hear the case because of a conflict of interest on the 
grounds that they were friends with Defendant Alan Young. Months later, Judge Claudia 
Laycock was appointed to the case. In or about September 2002, Laycock set a status 
hearing and at that hearing, Laycock recused herself from the case on the grounds of 
conflict of interest in that she had been recommended by Attorney Micheal Petro who 
was at that time, Alan Young's counsel attorney in this lawsuit. 
On or about July 08, 2003 this case was assigned to a Non-Senior Judge Pat Brian 
to sit in a Court of Equal Jurisdiction in a Different Judicial District. A Notice of Status 
Hearing was set on July 30, 2003 and scheduled on or about September 23, 2003. 
However, between November 14th and 20th of 2003, Plaintiff Ronald Chilton 
communicated with the Court via two (2) letters expressing that Plaintiffs1 counsel James 
Haskins had failed to submit key documents pertaining to the dates when Plaintiffs 
discovered that Alan Young owed vacation pay award monies to the Plaintiffs from the 
Pickering v. USX case. 
On or about December 05, 2003 Judge Pat Brian issued a memorandum decision 
denying Defendant's December 12,2003 motion to dismiss (Exhibit D, page 5) which 
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was treated as a summary judgment motion. 
The scheduling order was completed by April 27, 2004. By June 08, 2004, 
Plaintiff David Glazier hired Attorney Evan Schmutz as new Counsel. Some plaintiffs 
remained with James Haskins and others signed on to be represented with new counsel 
Evan Schmutz. 
From June 08. 2004 until December 06, 2004 the case proceeded normally 
aligning issues such as Initial Disclosures, motions for amened complaint, a simple 
substitution of party, and finally, order granting leave to amened the complaint. 
On April 06, 2005 Defendants filed a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment and on 
June 02. 2005 Plaintiffs responded with Memorandums in Opposition. From July 01, 
2005 until August 08,2005 the parties filed numerous papers that were concluded in 
Judge Pat Brian's September 22, 2005 Memorandum Decision when Judge Brian made an 
error against Plaintiffs by altering and misinterpreting the meaning of the BLA contract. 
In the BLA contract, which Judge Brian used as the key subject matter to make his final 
ruling. Judge Brian erred in his memorandum when he referenced the BLA because he 
replaced the word terminate with the word discharge. Pat Brian also misquoted the BLA 
pertaining to a reference of time for eligibility for vacation pay (Exhibit I, page 3, 9,10, 
11), but the correct regulation can be found in BLA §12-A- 1(b) (exhibit F). 
On October 13, 2005 Defendants filed for Summary Judgment on all remaining 
issues. This argument continued on paper until January 12,2006 when Judge Pat Brian 
filed a Memorandum Decision dismissing all remaining causes of action except for the 
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Defendants1 fiduciary duty as to how Defendants created and distributed the slush fund. 
Judge Brian dismissed all of these other causes because they were related to the vacation 
pay issue. The grounds for this dismissal were based on Defendant's false evidence and 
the courts misinterpretations of the BLA. 
On or about June 30, 2006 Plaintiffs' counsel Evan Schmutz withdrew from 
representing three of the Plaintiffs an on or about that same date, Plaintiffs filed a motion 
for reconsideration. Between July 6th and 14th of 2006 two abandoned Plaintiffs were 
forced to file Notice of Entry of Appearance as Pro-Se. The third dismissed himself from 
the case. 
Between August 16, 2006 and April 16, 2007 both parties filed numerous 
arguments over the motion to reconsider the current issues (including the vacation pay 
issue), several applications and motions to extend time and/or to file over length 
memorandums, a reply regarding Evan Schmutz withdraw of counsel, several letters, a 
subpoena, and a request to submit for decision. 
From May 07, 2007 and August 30, 2007 all clients of Evan Schmutz withdrew 
from him and filed their Notices of Entry of Appearance as Pro Se. 
At this point, the case had become so convoluted from switching counsel that 
Plaintiffs did not have a complete documented history of the case, and the two former 
counsel of Plaintiffs had not preserved a single judicial error nor violation of the Rules of 
Evidence. Pro se Plaintiffs had no choice but to file a Motion for New Trial on or about 
September 04.2007. The events and circumstances of this lawsuit could be construed as 
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exceptional circumstances under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
September 10, 2007 Defendants objected to Motion for New trial and on 
September 17, 2007 Plaintiffs objected to the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration 
on the Vacation Pay Issue and Concurrent Motion for Court to Reverse and Correct its 
Judicial Errors. Still, Plaintiffs have yet to be heard on the fiduciary breach claims even 
though the Defendants' have never provided any authenticated accounting records. 
Additionally, the Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial on all issues so triable, but none has 
been provided. 
From September 17, 2007 until October 29, 2007 both parties filed arguments and 
objections on all current dispositions, including 4 letters, and a submit for decision filed 
October 2. 2007. 
On or about March 15. 2008 the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and 
Order denying Plaintiffs on all issues. The Court did not acknowledge, address, nor 
provide hearing time on any Plaintiffs motions or issues, but simply denied Plaintiffs on 
the sudden, unexpected, and erroneous ground of Statute of Limitations. This was an 
unjust ruling fabricated as an escape hatch to avoid all the wrong doing and errors since 
the onset of this lawsuit. 
STAEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Early in this case, Plaintiffs were burdened with ineffective assistance of counsel, 
but were unaware of the insufficiencies until they lost their representation for the second 
time in June of 2006 leaving in disarray. 
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This suit had been in four different courts, 3 different jurisdictions, handled by 3 
different judges, two different attorneys for Plaintiffs, and then certain plaintiffs file as 
pro se for the second time. All of these events are part and parcel of that which 
constitutes the fundamental irregularities [Utah Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(1)]. 
Plaintiffs were forced to subpoena documents from Alan Young, Attorney Evan 
Schmutz and James Haskins (Exhibit M), but only received a partial history of the case. 
That is when Plaintiffs became Pro Se litigants. 
Plaintiffs counsel failed to object on pivotal issues. Plaintiffs counsel did not argue 
against hearsay evidence pertaining to the Basic Labor Agreement, unauthenticated 
accounting records, unsupported arguments pertaining to the Basic Labor Agreement, and 
also failed to enter Plaintiffs evidence showing when the Plaintiffs discovered that the 
Fraud had been committed. Furthermore, Plaintiffs counsel failed to include lost 
increased pensions in the complaint under the Fraud cause of action. The issue of 
Plaintiffs1 lost increased pensions was discovered only after Plaintiffs became pro se in 
2006 following their loss of counsel. 
The Defendants inadmissible unauthenticated accounting records were self serving 
records that were used for the purpose of convincing Plaintiffs that Defendant followed 
Judge Jenkins' instructions in his Federal Ruling from Pickering v. USX, but no real, 
transparent, verifiable, authenticated documents were provided to substantiate the 
Defendant's unauthenticated accounting records. Plaintiffs counsel should have 
demanded proof and objected to the lack thereof, but failed to preserve on completely 
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erroneous interpretations of the Basic Labor agreement (BLA). 
The BLA is contract between Plaintiffs and USX and issues such as vacation pay 
were never in dispute; not in the previous case of Pickering v. £/SXand not legally in this 
case. Instead of owning up to the fact that they breached their fiduciary duty to the 
Plaintiffs the Defendants1 would attempt to argue that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to 
vacation pay. However, the problem with their approach is that the issues were never in 
dispute in the Pickering case and the defendants are not a party to the BLA and do not 
have the right to determine its meaning for themselves. Particularly while using hearsay 
evidence and unsupported argument. Following that, the court then ignored Plaintiffs1 
opposition to such objectionable procedures. If they could conjure up an expert witness, 
one who could bring "prior course of dealings" as per UCC law, or some legal admissible 
form of evidence to substantiate their defense, then OK, but they never provided 
admissible evidence. These self serving interpretations included convincing the court to 
go as far as redefining "terminate" into the words "effectively discharged" because they 
could not substantiate actual "Discharge". The meanings are entirely different and most 
certainly have entirely different effects and conclusions as they pertain to the Basic Labor 
Agreement. The Defendants did this and more and they did it with no authority and no 
proof; it was done completely by brute force of the court and Plaintiffs counsel stood idly 
by without peeping a single "OBJECTION!" After pulling off this hijacking of the BLA, 
the Plaintiffs were forced to suddenly become pro se Plaintiffs, but the case was in 
shambles. The Plaintiffs still managed to notice the court and preserve with objections 
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and motions. On or about September 2007, and as a matter of law, the Defendants were 
boxed in by Plaintiffs' motions and supporting memorandums. The courts only choice 
was to reverse the errors or to provide the Plaintiffs with a new trial, but the lower court 
had the unmitigated gull to dismiss this case in the face of its own errors even though it 
had notice of those errors. The court initiated on its own accord an unjust ruling of statute 
of limitations as an unfair escape route for the Defendants. In doing this, the court 
overturned a prior ruling favoring the plaintiffs on this issue without providing any 
opportunity for Plaintiffs to argue. It did this after four years of litigation because the 
Plaintiffs finally defeated the Defendants on the material fact issues. 
These deficiencies of Plaintiffs' counsel allowed the Defense to use faulty 
evidence to mislead the District Court into artificial "new light" causing the illegal 
overturning of the prior Federal Court ruling on the Pickering v. L£?Xcase. Plaintiffs in 
Pro Se preserved by objection and notified the Trial Court of errors (refer to Plaintiffs' 
"Memorandum In Support of Motion for New Trial" filed September 4, 2007). The Court 
did err in not correcting these issues. 
Plaintiffs' twice deficient counsel followed by loss of counsel were exceptional 
circumstances that hindered the process of flow of the case, and when counsel was 
present, he was entirely ineffective on several key areas: 1. The complaint was missing a 
cause of action pertaining to the lost pension issue. 2. Counsel failed to preserve with 
objections, including the Defendants' obvious, unauthenticated, hand-drawn accounting 
documents used to erroneously formulated lost wages using 0.53 instead of page 193 and 
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231 of Judge Jenkins' Federal Ruling instructions to use 0*58 (Exhibit E). 3. Counsel 
allowed the Defense, a non-party to the BLA, to illegally interpreted the BLA by twisting 
its meaning in the attempt to equate "terminate" with "discharge" and then applying this 
non-existent straw-man type argument, an argument with no genuine material facts and 
no supporting substance; only fabrications. (Exhibit C, page 2, paragraph 2 ) . 
Following that foisting of false facts, the court also misquoted the eligibility 
requirements by inserting a 6 month time stamp that simply did not exist. 4. Counsel 
stood passively while Judge Pat Brian erroneously altered the language of the BLA 
(Exhibit I, page 11, paragraph 2) and never objected to the fact that there was no party 
to the BLA contract present to make such a legal claim and 5. Plaintiffs' Counsel allowed 
all these acts to go unobstructed by not objecting to the overturning of the Jenkins 
Federal ruling when the Defense's misrepresented facts on vacation pay eligibility dates 
and the courts misquotes of the BLA (Exhibit I pages 2, 3. 9, 10, 11). Standard of 
Review speaks to these issues: 
When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we will address the issue 
only if (1) the appellant establishes that the district court committed "plain 
error," (2) "exceptional circumstances" exist, or (3) in some situations, if 
the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to 
preserve the issue. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ^ ) 8, 122 P.3d 566; State 
v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, % 21 n. 2,61 P.3d 1062. 
Specifically, The Defense unlawfully reinterpreted the Basic Labor Agreement 
(BLA) and in this way, misled the Court when the Defense replaced a critical defining 
word "terminate" with the word "discharge" that would then modify the terms of the 
BLA. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to the Defendants based on this 
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deceptive argument. Additionally, a line was taken out of context from BLA §12-A-3 
without including the entire paragraph. These word swaps and twists were the erroneous 
new light the Defense used to cause the Court to illegally overturn a Federal Ruling on 
vacation pay that was originally correct, was never in dispute in Pickering v. USX, and 
the Defense never provided any expert witness testimony, no proof of prior course of 
dealings, nor any admissible evidence of any kind. The Defense instead provided hearsay 
and an unauthenticated piece of paper all of which the Plaintiffs completely crushed with 
totally substantiated proof, but the lower court ignored that proof even though Plaintiffs 
preserved and filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial. Pro Se Plaintiffs 
preserved on these errors and tried to correct them. Refer to Plaintiffs' "Memorandum In 
Support of Motion for New Trial11 (Exhibit A) and also, "Memorandum in Support of 
Objection of Plaintiffs on Denial of Motion for Reconsideration on the Vacation Pay 
Issue and Concurrent Motion for Court to Reverse and Correct its Judicial Errors 
(Exhibit C). 
When Plaintiffs became Pro Se in June 30, 2006 and began to gamer information 
about how the case had been handled, they saw the errors of their former counsel, but 
also discovered new evidence that justified court correction or a new trial. Once operating 
as Pro Se litigants in 2006, Plaintiffs discovered: 1. The accrued 1987 vacation pay dates 
had been misrepresented as accrued 1988 from the original Federal Ruling. To add insult 
to injury, Pat Brian's also misquoted the BLA pertaining to time eligibility requirements 
for vacation pay in his Memorandum Decision September 22,2005 on page 11. line 3 
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(Exhibit I) and see a copy of the BLA at BLA §12-Al(b). This caused Judge Pat Brian to 
overturn the Federal ruling which caused Plaintiffs to lose the vacation pay earned in 
1987 that would have become available in 1988. 2. When the vacation pay issue was 
overturned, Pat Brain dismissed all the other causes of action that were related to the 
vacation pay issue issue. 3. Lost wage calculations were formulated as 0.53 (Exhibit L), 
but should have been 0.58 (Exhibit E page 75 and 90) and these errors were 
unsupported, but were accompanied only by unauthenticated documents hand-drawn by 
Defendants' with no genuine accounting records to substantiate them. The formula further 
deviated from the Federal instruction by using 1984-1986 W2 forms to figure average 
wages rather than the required 80 plus hour pay periods as awarded by Judge Jenkins in 
Pickering v. USX (Exhibit E page 31 paragraph 2). 
Plaintiffs did earn 1987 vacation pay that should have been paid in 1988 and is a 
default asset not an award as per UCC 2-106(3) pertaining to surviving terms. If this issue 
had been in dispute, it would have been raised in the Pickering v. USX trial. Plaintiffs1 
objections and evidence was ignored by the lower court, but should have been reviewed 
by way of Plaintiffs"s motion to reconsider and preservations. 
Plaintiffs!s preserved on the court's errors because Pat Brian altered the BLA 
contract terminology of "terminate" and "discharge", on the misquotes of time eligibility, 
and also preserved when the Defendants were found having entered inadmissible 
evidence in the form of unauthenticated documents. Plaintiffs also preserved on the use 
of incorrect formulas for lost wage calculations, misrepresented vacation pay eligibility 
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dates, and in offering hearsay evidence in the illegally redefining of the BLA contract. 
Prior to dismissal, Plaintiffs filed Motion for New Trial, and notified the Court of 
judicial errors, evidence violations, misrepresentation of facts, the concealment of actual 
facts, and the erroneous application of mathematical formulas to calculate lost wages. 
Additionally, pro se Plaintiffs were never given court time to argue the fiduciary breach 
issues on pension and lost wage and were never given the jury trial they demanded. See 
Plaintiffs' September 4, 2007 Memorandum in Support of New Trial (page 2, item 4). 
The Trial Court abused its discretion when it overturned the Federal Ruling on the 
vacation pay issue and again when it failed to respond to Plaintiffs1 objections and 
motions to correct the errors and the evidence violations. 
"Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we 
review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an 
abuse of discretion." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, % 8, 76 P.3d 1165. 
The May 8, 1995 Judge Jenkins's Federal ruling outlined the correct multiplier to 
be 0.58 (7 months of a year) when calculating the Plaintiffs' lost wages. However, when 
the Defendant Young calculated the wages he did not follow the Jenkins ruling, but 
instead used an erroneous multiplier of 0.53. Defendants' accounting records were 
unsupported by authenticated, transparent facts, but instead were self-created 
unauthenticated accounting documents that should never had been admitted into the court 
record without authenticated records to substantiate the Defendants' own documentation 
and in doing so, violated evidence rules. Defendants miscalculated lost wages by using 
the number .53 instead of the Judge Jenkins ruling that instructed a .58 calculation. In 
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these same calculations, the Defendants used a 3 year average, but the Jenkins1 decision 
demanded that only 80 plus hour pay periods be used. Plaintiffs objected and proved with 
full documentation the corrected formula. The objections were ignored, but should have 
been reviewed by way of Plaintiffs1 motion to reconsider. 
Another big problem was that Counsel for the Plaintiffs failed to raise issues 
pertaining to lost pension caused by Defendants' fiduciary breach and negligence. This 
issue was never included in the complaint, but should have been, and now it manifests an 
ongoing wrong doctrine. By the time the Plaintiffs were forced into Pro Se status, it was 
all they could do just trying to recover the vacation pay issue and object to preserve 
current issues. They didn't have time and resources to take backward steps in order to 
recover from Counsel's earlier deficient representation and is all part and parcel of the 
exceptional circumstances. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim, raised for the first time on 
appeal, presents a question of law. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). As stated earlier, to prevail on an ineffective 
assistance claim, Defendant must show not only "that his trial counsel's 
performance . . . fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," but 
also that his counsel's deficient representation "prejudiced the outcome of 
the trial." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In the Trial Court's final ruling, Judge Roth dismissed on statute of limitations, but 
Plaintiffs are not barred for the following reasons: 
a) No party motioned for statute of limitations nor was any argument availed to 
Plaintiffs on this issue. 
b) In the Judge Brian's Memorandum Decision December 05,2003 (Exhibit D), 
Statute of Limitations had already been argued and won favoring Plaintiffs. 
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c) There were issues and judicial errors pending; Pro Se Plaintiffs preserved 
(Exhibit A). The Trial Court was obligated to correct the errors once they were 
raised by motion and objection. 
d) The Defense used concealment to hide and misrepresent facts about the 
vacation pay dates; objections were made, but Trial Court did not correct. 
e) Plaintiffs did not become aware of the insufficiencies of their counsel's 
mishandling of the case, nor of the Defense as a non-party to the BLA, illegally 
redefining the BLA, and the falsifying and misrepresentation of evidence and 
formulas on the vacation pay and lost wages issues until late 2006, well within 
Statute of Limitations. 
The district court abused its discretion when failing to review Plaintiffs1 objections 
and again when dismissing on grounds of Statute of limitations. 
The accounting documents that were entered into the record by the Defense were 
unauthenticated, inadmissible evidence. These same documents were used to falsely 
substantiate the erroneous accounting information; Plaintiffs objected and motioned the 
court to look at the problem, but the court failed to revisit the issue and Plaintiffs1 motions 
were ignored. 
There is also an issue of the Defendants1 double dipping contingency fees that is 
exposed in his self-created unauthenticated documents and this issue was shown to the 
court at the oral hearing on September 17, 2007, but has yet to be addressed by the trial 
court although Plaintiffs raised this material issue by objection. In Judge Roth's 
memorandum decision March 15, 2008, Roth restated the double dipping issue and said, 
"Plaintiffs complained the contingency fee is too high", a misrepresentation of the facts. 
The vacation pay issue of Judge Jenkins was illegally overturned by 
misrepresentation of facts regarding vacation pay dates and controlling terms in the Basic 
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Labor Agreement. Plaintiffs objected properly, but were ignored. 
The lower court had no right to overturn the Jenkins ruling on the vacation pay 
issue, but was misled when the Defendants concealed the true dates for which vacation 
pay was accrued. The lower court should have corrected the error when Plaintiffs filed 
objections and motions to correct the errors so they could recover their lost vacation pay. 
The court made errors when it failed to revers upon notice by motions and 
objections to Defendants hearsay in redefining the Basic Labor Agreement between the 
Plaintiffs and USX Corp. Further, the Defendants are not a party to the BLA contract nor 
were they authorities on the definition and terms of the BLA as it applies to the Plaintiffs. 
As a defense to their fiduciary breach and fraud, Defendants' provided no expert 
testimony or prior course of dealing and yet had the audacity to attack the Basic Labor 
Agreement terms that are clearly protected by the UCC 2-106(3) and were never in 
dispute at anytime in the Pickering v USX case. 
From the Defendants repeatedly using the word "discharged" in their their 
documents to redefine the BLA, the court erred when it illegally changed the terminology 
of the contract by replacing the word "terminate" with the word "discharge" (Exhibit I), 
then made a ruling by way of these changes and in so doing, victimized the Plaintiffs 
with a false and fabricated set of agreements that were not applicable to the Plaintiffs. 
The following are attached: 
a) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trail (Exhibit A from 
the docketing statement). 
b) Judge Roth's March 15, 2008 final Memorandum Decision and Order 
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(Defendants1 Third Summary Judgment Motion and Other Pending Motions) 
(Exhibit B from the docketing statement) 
c) Memorandum in Support of Objection of Plaintiffs on Denial of Motion for 
Reconsideration on the Vacation Pay Issue and Concurrent Motion for Court to 
Reverse and Correct its Judicial Errors. 
d) Memorandum Decision of Judge Pat Brian issued December 5, 2003, 
e) Certain pages of Judge Jenkins1 Ruling on Vacation Pay Eligibility issued May 
5.1995. 
f) Certain pages of the Basic Labor Agreement: BLA §12-A-1(b) (Vac Pay 
Eligibility), BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeit Language), BLA §8-A and 8-B (Suspension 
and Discharge) 
g) Chilton Letters showing SOL clock start on discovery 
h) Memorandum Decision of Pat Brian issued January 12, 2006. 
i) Memorandum Decision of Pat Brian dated September 22, 2005. 
j) Memorandum in Support of Certain Plaintiffs1 Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Courts First Entry of Summary Judgment (Vacation Pay Issue) and 
Opposition to the Defendants' Joint Motions to Strike the Motions for 
Reconsideration of Chilton and Glacier, November 6,2006. 
k) Defendants1 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1 Motion for 
Reconsideration, 
1) Unauthenticated documents submitted by the Defendants 
m) Subpoenas issued to Allen Young, Evan Schmutz, James Haskins 
n) Evan Schmutz withdrawal as counsel 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Dismissing this lawsuit on th grounds of statute of limitations is not appropriate. 
Denying Plaintiffs their surviving contract terms in the Basic Labor Agreement has 
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been based entirely on false premises. The Defendants have never provided a single shred 
of admissible evidence in their defense. The pro se Plaintiffs have proven their claims. 
The Plaintiffs have proven their claims with facts, evidence, and supporting laws and 
have identified under no uncertain terms the misrepresentations of the Defense that were 
used to confuse and mislead the court for the purposes of twisting the truth. 
For the Plaintiffs lawsuit to be dismissed on statute of limitations after all the time 
invested and at the moment the Defendants were defeated suggests that this result has 
always been a foregone conclusion in the mind of Mr. Roth. That the lower court, under 
Judge Roth, had never intended on providing Plaintiffs a trial let alone a fair one. 
Plaintiffs did the right thing by sending the court the letters indicating that they 
were concerned about the adequacy of their counsel early in the lawsuit because it 
achieved two important things: (1) it got the documentation filed in the record and (2) it 
substantiates that the Plaintiffs are not simply blaming their counsel last minute, but that 
they saw the problem early on in this lawsuit. 
One fact is clear, the fact that Plaintiffs counsel was critically deficient in the most 
important areas and moments of this lawsuit. There would be a different result if counsel 
had performed even the most elementary of tools of trial litigation. Instead, they didn't 
even perform a single objection to confront some of the most obvious and blatant 
violations of the rules of evidence, let alone try to expose the Defenses erroneous and 
even fictitious arguments. 
The court should have reversed and corrected the vacation pay issue. The court 
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should not have given Defendants1 summary judgment on lost wages and vacation pay, 
but should have reversed the summary judgment when noticed of the errors. The court 
should have recognized that Plaintiffs were not getting a fair trial and were prejudiced by 
losing council twice and these events did affect the outcome of the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL IS DEFECIENT AND FAILES TO 
PRESERVE AGAINST DEFENDANTS' FICTICIOUS 
ARGUMENTS, UNAUTHENTICATED DOCUMENTS, HEARSAY, 
AND ILLEGALY REDEFING THE BLA (BASIC LABOR 
AGREEMENT). 
Plaintiffs argue that their counsel was ineffective in failing to object to Defendant's 
hand written, unauthenticated accounting record. The Defendant's accounting record 
violates evidence rules and fails to substantiate any true paper trail nor is the record 
transparent or auditable in any way, shape, or form. 
After the Plaintiffs lost their counsel the second time and became pro se plaintiffs 
in mid 2006, the Plaintiffs found these discrepancies and objected with motions to initiate 
a correction. Plaintiffs also filed a subpoena to demand Defendant Alan Young to provide 
a transparent accounting record of the source and distribution of Pickering v. USX award 
monies, but the Defendant never provided a true, correct, authenticated, accounting 
record of any kind. Not even so much as a deposit slip. Plaintiffs1 counsel was completely 
ineffective in properly fighting this lawsuit and made no effort to stop inadmissible 
evidence from entering the record. 
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"An effective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a 
question of law.M5ltete v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, U 6, 89 R3d 162. To establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Plaintiffs must demonstrate both that "counsel's performance was 
deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment," 
and that " counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial^'S/ate v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76,1| 19, 12 R3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
To establish the first prong of the Strickland test, Plaintiffs must "rebut the strong 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy."'hitherland, 2000 UT 76, fl 19 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). If a court can conceive of a tactical basis for counsels actions, then counsel is 
not deficient under the first Strickland prong. See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, H 11,4 
R3d 778 (first prong of Strickland not satisfied because conceivable that counsel's 
conduct resulted from deliberate and tactical choice); State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 
K 58, 61 P.3d 291 (same). To establish the second prong, Plaintiff must show prejudice, 
that is, they "must show . . . a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient 
conduct Plaintiffs would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial" Clark, 2004 
UT 25,1| 6 (citing State v. Crosby, 927 R2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)); Strickland466 U.S. at 
687. 
A. Here, Plaintiffs can show deficient performance and prejudice. Plaintiffs 
can show deficient performance because a conceivable tactical basis did not exist for 
counsel having not objecting to unauthenticated, hand written, accounting records. 
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Because the Defendant's unauthenticated accounting record is not transparent, is not 
auditable, and does not show the source and distribution of Pickering v. USX award 
monies nor does the Defendant's accounting record show a auditable and transparent use 
the legal fees that were paid by Plaintiffs, there is no reasonable legal tactic or strategy 
that could benefit Plaintiffs in the outcome of this lawsuit by Plaintiffs counsel not 
opposing and objecting to Defendant's unauthenticated, handwritten, accounting record 
(Exhibit L). Conversely, by not objecting to the Defendant's self serving handwritten 
records, the court acted on the Defendant's fictitious records as if they were real and 
accurate and therefore. Plaintiffs were denied a fair trial. Plaintiffs counsel, Evan 
Schmutz failed to request documents, or file a subpoena for Defendants' true accounting 
records nor did Plaintiffs' counsel object to the Defendant's use of unauthenticated 
handwritten accounting records. 
Plaintiffs can show prejudice because the conduct of the Plaintiffs' counsel 
unquestionably prejudiced the outcome of this trial on this issue. If counsel had 
performed his job to at least a normal standard, the outcome would most certainly have 
been different. Furthermore, because the Defense never produced authenticated 
documents, Plaintiffs counsel should have moved for summary judgment for the 
Plaintiffs, but he did not. From the behavior of the Plaintiffs counsel, one could conclude 
that counsel was working against his client in support of the opposing side. 
B. Here, Plaintiffs can again show deficient performance and prejudice. 
Plaintiffs can show deficient performance because a conceivable tactical basis did not 
25-50 
exist for counsel's not objecting to the Defendants redefining of the meaning of the BLA 
pertaining to Plaintiffs vacation pay eligibility. The Plaintiffs counsel was deficient when 
he failed to object to several legal errors pertaining to Defendant's raising and altering of 
the meaning to the BLA contract with USX, and in this failure, the Plaintiffs were 
prejudiced because there absolutely is a different outcome of this case that would have 
resulted. Plaintiffs Counsel failed to oppose the Defendant's committing of the following 
legal errors when they redefined and misinterpreted the Basic Labor Agreement (BLA): 
1. Alan Young raised a non-existent "straw-man" argument that fictitiously placed 
him in the position of Defendant in the Pickering v. LBXcase and then, with erroneous 
and false premises, proceeded to argue away Plaintiffs rights by redefining and 
misrepresenting the terms of the BLA. Pickering v. USX is a closed case where Plaintiffs 
had already been given the accrued 1987 vacation pay by default and that issue was never 
in dispute between the parties in Pickering v. USX. Vacation pay is a surviving right of the 
contract (UCC 2-106(3)) and that is why it was never in dispute in the Pickering v. USX 
case. The only mention of vacation pay in Pickering v. USX was the final Federal Court 
ruling outlining everything Plaintiffs will be awarded (Exhibit E page 193). However, in 
this lawsuit, Defendant Alan Young created a fictitious vacation pay dispute between 
himself and Plaintiffs as a defense against his fiduciary breach for not paying vacation 
pay monies he owed to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs counsel, Evan Schmutz never objected to this 
error in law (Utah Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(6) "Insufficiency of the evidence" and 
Rule 59(a)(7) "Error in Law"). 
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2. After Alan Young tricked the court into allowing his fictitious argument to 
ensue with no opposition from Plaintiffs' counsel, he then created another false and 
fictitious argument about the vacation pay dates claiming that the Plaintiffs were not 
entitled to accrued 1988 vacation pay, which would be true, but is moot since it was 
accrued 1987 vacation to be paid in 1988, but again, this is not a legitimate argument 
because vacation pay had not been in dispute, was a closed Federal case, was a done deal 
by default of Pickering v. USX, is protected by UCC 2-106(3), and is therefore, again 
MError in Law" let alone all the evidence rules that were violated. Yet, Plaintiffs counsel 
Evan Schmutz never objected and so the court allowed Alan Young to win on Summary 
Judgment on these erroneous issues with no opposition from Plaintiffs Counsel Evan 
Schmutz. Therefore and under no uncertain terms, this was deficient performance of 
counsel and prejudiced the outcome of the case. 
3. Alan Young created yet again another false argument over non-issues from 
Pickering v. USX and claimed that the Plaintiffs were "discharged" when in fact, they 
were terminated (something entirely different from being discharge). When terminated, 
there are surviving terms such as vacation pay (UCC §2-106 (3)), but when discharged, 
there are no surviving benefits except vested pensions. In this fabrication, Alan Young 
attempts to redefine the BLA (Basic Labor Agreement) by erroneously claiming Plaintiffs 
were discharged (an action against individual criminal behavior) from USX instead of 
terminated (a company caused job loss) as a way to avoid his fiduciary breach. This 
manipulation and reinterpretation of the BLA is not only completely erroneous, it is 
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illegal because there was no dispute between the BLA parties* Alan Young is not a party 
to the BLA and he cannot pretend to be one as a defense to fiduciary breach. Alan Young 
did this as a distraction to his fiduciary breach for not paying Plaintiffs the vacation 
monies owed to them. The lower court favored Defendant's in a summary judgment 
because of no opposition from Plaintiffs Counsel. The Defendants arguments were 
without merit and were false and because they went unopposed by Plaintiffs counsel, did 
prejudice the outcome of the case. If Defendants had been forced to argue and prove their 
defense, the outcome of the case would be different, but their argument, while 
unsupported in law, went unopposed because of deficient counsel. Plaintiffs1 counsel did 
not defend these errors nor object in any way, but stood passively while Defendants 
bamboozled the court and legal process. In the memorandum decisions of both 
September 27, 2005 and also January 12,2006, Judge Pat Brian included the words 
"effectively discharged" when ruling against the Plaintiffs- The court had no authority to 
modify the meaning a the BLA agreement by adding words "effectively discharged". For 
the lower court to try a case over terms of the BLA, the court would need to have a 
dispute between the parties to the BLA itself or, would need a true form of evidence 
defining the terms of the BLA such as a expert witness or a BLA historical prior course of 
dealing to support the ruling and yet Plaintiffs counsel again stood passively and failed to 
object. The result of counsel's deficiencies prejudiced the Plaintiffs because a corrected 
interpretation of the BLA would yield a different result. Judge Brian also misquoted the 
BLA §12-A-l-b on page 11 of his September 27, 2005 memorandum decision pertaining 
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to a 6 months time element, but Plaintiffs were never allowed to correct this error on 
account of their counsel Evan Schmutz failing again to argue the issue and object to the 
Judge's erroneous interpretation. 
4. Defendants argued the terms of the BLA with no proof, no authorities, no 
experts or direct party testimony, and no admissible conclusive documents, but instead 
used nothing more than hearsay; all oral or written interpretations of the BLA and claims 
by the defense were HEARSAY and are inadmissible (Utah Rule 803). Plaintiffs counsel 
again stood passively, did not object to any evidence violations, and allowed the 
Defendants to file an unopposed summary judgment motion. The Plaintiffs counsel never 
requested nor demanded a history of the BLA and its prior course of dealings nor did 
Defendants provide any. Any of the common legal practices, if utilized by the Plaintiffs 
counsel could have yielded a different outcome in the case and therefore, shows both 
deficiencies of counsel and that those deficiencies prejudiced the Plaintiffs in this case. 
C Plaintiffsfrs counsel again failed to act in the interest of Plaintiffs when the 
Defendants used incorrect formula to calculate lost wages as per the instructions of the 
Federal court ruling in Pickering v USX. Defendants used 0.53 in place of 0.58 and the 
Defense counsel said nothing to raise the issue and protect the interest of the Plaintiffs. 
This most certainly shows a different outcome would have resulted and did prejudice the 
Plaintiffs. 
Subsequent arguments pertaining to vacation pay and lost wages will show that 
there is no way this case could have been lost but for the deep deficiencies of counsel 
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because the evidence violations and and the facts surrounding vacation pay and lost 
wages are so blatantly obvious and self evident that no counsel even on the most basic 
level should have not managed the case differently. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRS WHEN IT DENIES PLAINTIFFS1 
CONTRACTUAL SURVIVING RIGHTS PERTAINING TO THE BASIC 
LABOR AGREEMENT. BASED ON ERRONEOUS INFORMATION, 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITS REVERSABLE ERROR WHEN 
OVERTURNING THE PRIOR FEDERAL COURT RULING OF JUDGE 
JENKINS. 
The Vacation Pay issues that were erroneously ruled upon by way of Defendants 
otherwise inadmissible evidence are: 
a. Confusion over the dates of 1987 and 1988 for eligibility 
b. Confusion over meaning of Terminated and Discharged. 
We will show the court that Plaintiffs do qualify for vacation pay and in so doing, 
show the court where and how the Defendants have mislead the lower court into judicial 
error on this issue. We will also show that the original Federal ruling of Judge Jenkins 
was correct and that the lower court should not have overturned the ruling, but should 
have corrected the error as soon as Plaintiffs brought forth the evidence, facts, and laws in 
support of as much. 
We will also show that law and argument, including some argument from the 
Defense, actually supports Plaintiffs position. 
Although Plaintiffs1 lower court memorandums in support of motion for 
reconsideration and new trial along with our objections to the Defense and lower court's 
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errors establishes in solid terms the legal foundation on these issues. We will attempt to 
create here an even more contrasting conclusion favoring Plaintiffs. 
The BLA sections we will look at are: 12-A-l (Eligibility) and 12-A-3 
(Forfeiture). 
The first order of business in clearing up the Vacation Pay issue is to show how the 
Defense misconstrued the accrued 1987 vacation pay dates. Following that we will show 
how the Defense then attempted to disqualify Plaintiffs for vacation pay by misconstruing 
the effects of BLA terms regarding "Termination" versus "Discharge and their attempt to 
equate the terms as having the same meaning. 
Factl: Plaintiffs earned an accrued 1987 vacation pay. Accrued vacation pay is 
normally paid in the following year. Therefore, the 1987 accrued vacation pay would be 
paid out n 1988. However, the 1988 date is irrelevant because the only thing that matters 
is that Plaintiffs are owed their accrued 1987 vacation pay which is now overdue. That's 
the simple truth regarding these dates. 
Fact 2: Because the 1987 vacation pay would have been paid in 1988, the Defense 
has played into these dates and confused the court into thinking it is 1988 vacation pay 
that the Plaintiffs are seeking, but they are not. They are seeking 1987 vacation pay; that's 
all! 
The Defense spoke incorrectly about these dates in their arguments so many times 
that in so doing, convinced the court that Plaintiffs did not qualify for 1987 vacation. 
They did this by referring to 1987 vacation pay that would have been paid in 1988 as 
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though it were accrued 1988 vacation which of course, the steelworkers did not accrue. 
Example for clarification: If the workers had accrued 1988 vacation pay, it would 
be scheduled to be paid in 1989. However, we are not talking about accrued 1988 
vacation pay to be paid in 1989. What we are talking about is accrued 1987 vacation pay 
that would have been scheduled to be paid in 1988 (the following year from the year of 
accrual). In fact, the 1987 vacation pay could, in some instances, be collected while in 
1987, but usually workers wait for the following year. 
To say that plaintiffs did not qualify for 1988 vacation pay would be a true 
statement, but to say that they did not qualify to be paid their 1987 vacation pay in the 
year of 1988 would be a false statement 
It was this simple area where the meaning of these dates was mixed up and 
misconstrued. Look at Defendants argument in (Exhibit K, page 5), the Defenses Motion 
to Strike Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. Read lines 1 through 11 to see how they 
worded their statements to see the problem they caused. You will also notice that they 
were able to get the original and correct Judge Jenkins Federal Court ruling overturned 
based on their erroneous and misconstrued argument. It is very sad and frustrating that 
the Plaintiffs have had to suffer so much litigation just trying to solve this simple issue, 
but the fact that Plaintiffs were forced to argue these issues at this point and time in this 
lawsuit substantiates their "deficiencies of counsel" claim found in other parts of this 
brief to show that Plaintiffs are entitle to this appeal. 
On page 8 of Exhibit K, lines 10 through 15 very clearly shows how the court was 
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confused on this Vacation Pay date issue and how the Defense misled the court. Defense 
counsel Mr. Burbidge states in quoting Judge Jenkins's Federal Court ruling, 
"Judge Brian correctly ruled that the steelworker were only entitled to 1988 
vacation pay if they were still employed as of January 1, 1988. Because 
Judge Jenkins had ruled that all of the steelworker were terminated when 
USX sold the Geneva steel plant to Basic Minerals and Technologies, Inc. 
effective August 31, 1987, the steelworkers were not entitled to 1988 
vacation pay." 
So while Pat Brian's ruling was correct, his application was wrong because 
qualification for 1988 vacation pay is a moot point. No Plaintiffs are seeking 1988 
vacation pay, but are seeking 1987 vacation pay. However, in reading the above from 
Judge Brian's ruling, Judge Brian has also establish the fact that Plaintiffs were entitled to 
1987 benefits and they were "terminated", not "discharged. Therefore, favoring Plaintiffs 
on the Vacation Pay issue, and possibly other issues pertaining to the steelworkers 
surviving benefits in the year of 1987 is a matter of Summary Judgment favoring the 
Plaintiffs as admitted by Defense counsel's own document. Exhibit K, page 8. 
This Exhibit K also authentically documents other facts at issue. First, it shows 
that the original Jenkins (the Federal Ruling) was overturned and, when looking at other 
upcoming facts, it will show that it was overturned in judicial error. For now, look at 
Exhibit K, page 2 in the Title/Description of the document. This document title 
substantiates that Plaintiffs did try to correct this issue since Exhibit K is an opposing 
motion against Plaintiffs attempt to get reconsideration on this issue. 
The next step in this tour of the destruction of Plaintiffs rights is to to be sure that 
Jenkins did give Plaintiffs 1987 vacation pay to be paid in 1998. Looking again at 
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Exhibit K on page 5, look at lines 7 and 8 where it discusses the Geneva plant sales date 
as being August 31, 1987. This is the key to 1987 Vacation Pay qualification to be paid in 
1988. Although Exhibit K substantiates this date on its own by way of the page 5 
discussion, it is good to see it for ourselves from the Judges pen. Look at Exhibit E page 
193 (identified at the bottom of the page), paragraph 289, at the 3rd line in that 
paragraph. Here we can see that Jenkins did in fact include vacation pay. However, let us 
also see where the 1987 vacation pay is fully substantiated. Exhibit E on the West Law 
page identified as page 6, 1st paragraph under Idling ("Active" and "Management) 
Plaintiffs shows why Jenkins awarded all benefits for which Plaintiffs would qualify 
under the terms of the August 31, 1987 sale of the Geneva Plant. This shows us that the 
original Jenkins ruling calculated employee benefits as if the plant had remained opened 
until August 31, 1987 and vacation pay for 1987 is included in those benefits as has 
already been shown. 
Another problem that was caused by the Defensed was when they took out of 
context from the "Forfeiture Language" of the Basic Labor Agreement (BLA). To see 
where the Defense misled the court in this way, return to Exhibit K, page 5, lines 10 and 
11. Here we see that Defense counsel Mr. Burbidge states, 
" . . . a steelworker was not entitled to vacation pay in 1988 if he or she was 
discharged prior to January 1,1988." 
The above quote from the Defense counsel's memorandum contains two errors. 
The first is the repeated misstatement pertaining to 1988 vacation pay. Again, 1988 is 
moot and is irrelevant in this lawsuit. Plaintiffs are seeking their 1987 vacation pay, not 
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1988. Second, the Plaintiffs were never "discharged" and as we shall see, this became 
another area where the Defense misguided the court into an erroneous conclusion which 
led to the denial of Plaintiffs rights. 
DISCHARGE VERSUS TERMINATE 
In the Defense counsel's misrepresentation of terminate versus discharge, the 
defense has equated the two terms as if they are the same when in fact they are not. The 
intention of the Defendants is to escape their malfeasance buy confusing the court on this 
issue. The Defense has caused the lower to make a judicial error by claiming the effects 
of discharge are equal to terminate. This area of logic is one in which courts should be 
very careful to examine else cause substantial injustice. 
Fact 1: Discharge is caused by an act of an employee. 
Fact 2: Termination is caused by an act of the company. 
Exhibit E (the Federal court ruling) on the West Law page identified as page 6, 
1st paragraph under Idling ("Active11 and "Management) Plaintiffs on the 14th 
through 20th lines in that paragraph shows that Judge Jenkins stated. 
" . . . they had remained active employees who were terminated when 
Geneva was sold to BM&T in August of 1987." 
This shows under no uncertain terms that the Plaintiffs were "terminated", but were NOT 
"discharge". Reading further, Jenkins also states, 
"the "idling" Plaintiffs' individual remedies must be determined with 
reference to the seven-month "idling" period from February 1, 1987 
through August 31, 1987. 
This sets up the understanding as to why the Plaintiffs did qualify for all the 1987 
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benefits that survive as a matter of law. This is not limited to the BLA, but is a very 
common in most industries, including government employees. When terminated, all 
accrued benefits can still be collected and is the surviving rights of a contract UCC §2-
106(3). 
UCC §2-106(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a 
power created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise 
than for its breach. On "termination" all obligations which are still 
executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach 
or performance survives. 
As can be seen in the UCC, executory obligations get "discharged", but this does 
not refer to employees. This UCC also shows us that on "termination", rights based on 
"prior performance" survives. This would apply to vacation pay and other benefits. A 
very important showing in this UCC is that "discharge" IS NOT equated to "terminate". 
Hence, the bad case law. It is a fact and a maxim that anything similar IS NOT the same. 
Discharge and terminate may have some similarities, but they are absolutely not the 
same. However, their differences are contrasting enough that they should be obvious and 
should not be confused with one another. 
In the Basic Labor Agreement, the differences between discharge and terminate are 
very clear. When discharged, all benefits other than vested pensions are lost. Exhibit F, 
page 50 and 51 of the 1987 BLA in BLA §8-A and BLA §8-B defines Discharge and no 
where in this section is the word "terminate". 
Plaintiffs were never discharge. Not at any time were they ever discharge from 
USX. The Federal ruling on this issue is clear. The only reason the terminate and 
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discharge comparison came into question in this lawsuit of Chilton v. Young is because of 
the Defendants' malfeasance when they were counsel in the Pickering v. USX case. They 
now attempt to escape their wrong doing by raising this fabricated, erroneous, straw-man 
type discharge/terminate argument and then foisting it onto the Plaintiffs. 
The argument pertaining to whether Plaintiffs were discharge or terminated is 
another sad and frustrating area because Plaintiffs have again been forced to argue an 
issue that should otherwise be totally obvious but for the Defendant's misrepresentation 
of the "terminate" versus "discharge" issue. Additionally, the fact that Plaintiffs have 
noticed the court, preserved on these errors, and are trying to recover from the erroneous 
lower court conclusion that Plaintiffs were "discharge", again substantiates the 
deficiencies of Plaintiffs original counsel and the justification for this appeal. 
There is some bad case law that does equate an employee's being discharged to be 
che same as being terminated. This case law should be limited in use or perhaps 
overturned, but at the very least, it should not be allowed to penetrate a well established 
contract between a company and over 100,000 employees when the contract is already 
very well established as to its meaning. Additionally, this case law should only be viewed 
from a purely logical point of view. For example, if we were to assume that discharge is 
the same as terminate, must we then say that terminate is the same as discharge? No! If 
discharge triggered termination (which it can't under the BLA nor under UCC §2-106(3)), 
it would not be correct to say termination also will triggered discharge. Again, even if the 
court were to determine that an employee who is "discharged" is also "effectively 
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terminated", it would still be incorrect to say an employee who is "terminated" is also 
"effectively discharge". The one is not the other. It does work in reverse even if the court 
could get it to work in one direction. It is not a two way logical conclusion. There are too 
many factors. However, the issue is moot anyway because as a matter of law, they are not 
the same. The logic doesn't work. Therefore, terminate cannot be the same as discharge 
even if one were to find that discharge is the same as terminate. Besides, by inserting the 
word, "effectively" the contract has been tampered with. Their is no "effectively 
discharged". You either are or you are not discharged. The steelworkers were not 
discharged. For the lower court to dismiss this cause of action using the words, 
"effectively discharged" is a form of peremptory discharge with cannot be done according 
to the BLA. To discharge a steelworker as per the BLA, it requires management 
involvement and is based on a conclusion employee conduct. 
According to the BLA §8-B, to be discharged, the following rules apply: 
1. Cannot be peremptorily discharged 
2. Management must conclude the justification of suspension or discharge based 
on employee conduct. 
3. A copy of the discharge notice must shall be promptly furnished to such 
employee's grievance committee. 
None of the above processes have taken place and therefore, there is no possible 
way the steelworkers could be deemed to have been discharge nor "effectively 
discharged". All of these vacation pay issues were generated by the Defense to distort the 
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truth about the meaning of the BLA and to foist false argument against the Plaintiffs, it's 
outrageous! 
ARGUMENT III 
DEFENDANTS FAILED TO CORRECTLY CALCULATE LOST WAGES AS 
OUTLINED IN THE FEDERAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION. THE LOWER COURT 
MADE ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED THE LOST WAGES ISSUE IN THE FACE 
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER AND OBJECTIONS. A HEARING 
ON THE LOST WAGES ISSUE HAS NEVER BEEN PROVIDED. 
Because this issue is addressed in the preceding pages, we will attempt to stick to 
simple facts and references to evidence. 
The following "Lost Wages" issue is brought to this court because of the following 
reasons: (1) The Plaintiffs counsel of HJS failed to argue the issue which speaks to 
previous argument in this brief pertaining to Deficiencies of Counsel. (2) Defendants 
used the wrong formula to calculate wages and this resulted in substantial losses to 
Plaintiffs. (3) Plaintiffs preserved and raised this issue to the lower court, but were 
ignored. Plaintiffs were not given so much as a hearing. 
Fact 1: Allen Young used a 0.53 multiplier instead of a 0.58 multiplier when 
calculating wages. 
Fact 2: Allen Young used years 1984 through 1986 to calculate average wages. 
Exhibit L, item "Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs" shows that Allen Young 
did use 0.53 as the multiplier. However, Young should have used 0.58. Exhibit E, page 
75 and page 89 shows the correct multiplier of 0.58 as per Federal court ruling. 
Exhibit L. item "Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs" shows that Defendant 
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Young did use 1984 through 1986 for calculating average wages. However, Allen Young 
should have used back pay based upon income earned during pay periods in which a 
plaintiff worked 80 or more hours. Exhibit E, page 31, paragraph 2 outlines the proper 
formula for averaging wages. 
AH these facts were never argued by Plaintiffs counsel further substantiating 
deficiencies of counsel argument earlier in this brief. When Plaintiffs raised these 
material issues by way of Motions for Reconsideration and Objections, the lower court 
ignored Plaintiffs. 
ARGUMENTS 
PLAINTIFFS COUNSEL FAILES TO INCLUDE LOST INCREASED PENSIONS AS 
PART OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
Lost Pensions is part of the Defendants fiduciary breach that Plaintiffs earlier 
counsel failed to include in the complaint. This again speaks to the deficiencies of 
counsel issue. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITS A GROSSLY UNJUST ERROR 
WHEN DISMISSING ON STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND RAISES 
ISSUES OF CONSIPRACY AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
Judge Roth should have waved his right to Statute of Limitations (hereafter 
referred to as SOL) for allowing this case to go on for several years. In other words, there 
should be a SOL for using SOL when a law case has already ensued for eight (8) years. 
Roth came into this case in 2004, and now at the end of 2008, he raises SOL. This is 
unjust for several reasons. 
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SOL was defeated when Plaintiffs showed Judge Pat Brian in December 2003 that 
no Plaintiff knew that the Defendants had deceived them until they sat in the court 
hearing of Chamberlain v. Young of 2001 where Thomas Chamberlain was suing Alan 
Young for a finders fee. They had a witness on the stand by the name of Scott Daniels, a 
retired judge who stated after he read Judge Jenkins1 ruling that Alan Young owed all of 
the Plaintiffs vacation pay. That's when the Plaintiffs found out that they were owed 
vacation pay. No Plaintiff knew anything about vacation pay because Defendant Allan 
Young never at any time explained what the pay was for; just that it was your losses as he 
calculated them. Plaintiffs did not know what he calculated. Plaintiffs had never seen a 
ruling from Judge Jenkins. Plaintiffs did not know what the calculation figures from the 
Jenkins ruling were nor how they told Alan Young to use them. At that time they did not 
know about the calculations, but after their attorney Evan Schmutz withdrew from the 
case, they found out and have brought all of this forth and put it in front of Judge Roth, 
but Judge Roth has turned a blind eye to everything pro se Plaintiffs have given him. 
This instant law case was filed in 2001, approximately 30 days after Plaintiffs 
heard Judge Scott Daniels say on the witness stand that Alan Young owed Plaintiffs 
vacation pay that was accrued in 1987 to be paid in 1988. 
Because of the promise that Alan Young made to Plaintiffs that the settlement was 
100% plus more of Judge Jenkins1 ruling, no Plaintiff had any reason to go looking for 
anything if it was 100% plus more of Judge Jenkins ruling that they were entitled to 
receive, but no Plaintiff knew what Judge Jenkins had ruled except the Defendant 
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attorneys. 
At that time, Plaintiffs counsel James Haskins did not file these facts into the court 
record that would show the court when the Plaintiffs made this discovery of new 
evidence of Defendant Alan Young owing Plaintiffs money. Plaintiffs were expecting 
their counsel James Haskins to file this information into the court, but he did not file the 
information as instructed. This was pertaining to the SOL and was the purpose for filing 
the facts of discovery of new evidence. Allan Young had filed to have the case dismissed 
on the grounds of SOL, but Defendant was denied that motion because Ron Chilton had 
sent a letter, around his attorney, to Judge Pat Brian telling him that Plaintiffs attorney 
had not included the dates when they found out that they were owed vacation pay which 
was in the trial between Allan Young and Tom Chamberlain in May of 2001. 
It can be construed that the attorneys knew that Plaintiffs did not understand that 
Plaintiffs were owed money for vacation pay because it was never disclosed to the 
Plaintiffs. 
What Judge Roth is trying to do now is ignore the fact that if he were going to 
dismiss this case on SOL he should have attempted to dismiss it at the beginning, not 
after four years litigation under Roth, and four years before that under Judge Pat Brian. 
Isn't there an SOL for when the judge can decide an SOL dismissal? There should be! No 
party raised the issue; Roth brought SOL in on his own accord. But even so, SOL had 
already been argued and won favoring Plaintiffs with Judge Pat Brain at the onset of this 
lawsuit. Judge Brain believed the Plaintiffs were telling the truth when the events took 
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place and Brain has the discretion to make that decision. The SOL doesn't have a strong 
enough ground to stand on against the gravity of the material facts of this case, if this 
case is to be construed so to do substantial justice, which the law commands. Because (1) 
Plaintiffs already won SOL in Judge Pat Brian's December 5, 2003 decision (2) The court 
allowed the case to go for eight years, (four of which was with Judge Roth) before Roth 
decided to steal the case from the Plaintiffs with SOL. (3) Roth didn't hand out this unjust 
SOL dismissal until Plaintiffs defeated the Defendants at the last minute as a matter of 
law by providing clear, concise, articulate, accurate, and legally supported argument in 
Plaintiffs memorandums and objections. (4) The court is using the law to defeat the law 
(5) The court must weigh the test between the gravity of the 184 innocent victim 
Plaintiffs and their families that have been affected by the Defendants Misfeasance versus 
the very small group of guilty victimizing Defendant attorneys who have done nothing 
but distort the truth of the truth and who should have been penalized for their deceit in 
this lawsuit. (6) Exceptional circumstances come into play (7) Fraudulent concealment 
that Defendants knew that Plaintiffs did not know they were owed money. (8) Ongoing 
Wrong Doctrine (9) UCC 2-106(3) surviving rights of a contract. 
Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs were owed money and they knew that the 
Plaintiffs did not know that they were owed money. Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs 
were relying entirely on the information provided to them by counsel. After all, that is 
why the Plaintiffs hired counsel, to protect their interest no different from when a home 
buyer hires a title company to be certain the house is clear of any liens or other 
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encumbrances. In this lawsuit, Alan Young and associates was the Title company the 
Plaintiffs hired to make sure they would get all they were entitled to receive. Just as when 
a Title company must be responsible for their mistakes (title insurance), the Defendants 
must be responsible for their mistakes. It is exactly the same in comparison. Because the 
Plaintiffs hired Allan Young to determine what is the result of the USX plant closing 
down as it pertains to their rights and interests. How would this event effect the Plaintiffs 
situation? The Plaintiffs had no knowledge of these things. They relied entirely on their 
Counsel for exactly this purpose. Just like in the example with the Title company, 
Plaintiffs hired the attorneys to determine the issues and if the attorneys did not do the job 
correctly, then it is the attorneys that must bare the costs of their mistakes, just as does a 
title company. See Exhibit D and pay attention to page 4 and 5 where the case law was 
found to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss and treated that motion as summary 
judgment favoring Plaintiffs. 
It wasn't the Plaintiffs job to interpret the laws and determine the rights of the 
Plaintiffs when their company goes out of business; Plaintiffs hired the attorneys to 
interpret the laws so that when the attorneys came to the Plaintiffs and gave them the 
conclusion of the attorneys determination, Plaintiffs had a right to rely on the information 
and believe that the Plaintiffs counsel made the correct determination and were being told 
the truth. The Plaintiffs trusted what they were told by their counsel; they had no reason 
not to trust counsel at that time. When Plaintiffs were told by their counsel the results, 
Plaintiffs thought that was it, they hired an attorney who found out what the rights of the 
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Plaintiffs were and what the Plaintiffs were entitled to receive and that was it That was 
the professionalism of the lawyers and Plaintiffs trusted that they were being told the 
truth. At that time, Plaintiffs never thought they were not being told the truth. But then 
later, Plaintiffs find out by happen chance that the information from their counsel was not 
true: that Plaintiffs were suppose to get more money. Well, who is supposed to be 
responsible for that; for deceiving and telling Plaintiffs what their rights were? Plaintiffs 
were negotiating a final deal via counsel. What was the result of that final deal? Plaintiffs 
thought that the information was the result of the final deal that everybody had agreed to 
and that it was the best they could do and come up in the Plaintiffs interest, but Plaintiffs 
didn't know that they had anything remaining left over. Plaintiffs didn't know what the 
Basic Labor Agreement (BLA) meant under these conditions. The BLA did not address 
anything about the USX plant going out of business. Plaintiffs didn't know anything 
about UCC 2-106(3) about surviving rights. The Plaintiffs attorneys held this information 
from the Plaintiffs; they concealed it from their clients. They concealed it fraudulently by 
not letting the clients know that they were owed money and the clients never found out 
until they were sitting in a court hearing when a witness, brought it up; and who was that 
witness? In that hearing, Thomas Chamberlain was suing Allan Young for a finders fee 
and a witness, Judge Scott Daniels brought up the topic of monies that were still owne to 
the steelworkers from the Pickering v. USX case. 
The Plaintiffs didn't know the truth until the 2001 hearing of Chamberlain v. 
Young. If 1677 Pickering v. USX Plaintiffs did not say prior to that hearing, "Where's my 
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vacation pay?", that proves that no one understood that they were entitled to any further 
monies. That's the average; that would tell you that no one knew, except the client 
counsel. Out of 1677 people, the likelihood that someone would raise their voice and say, 
"I want my vacation pay" is so extremely likely if they knew, that it would literally be 
impossible that someone would not raise such an argument. The fact that no one raised 
the issue is proof that no one knew they were entitled to anything more. No steelworkers 
understood that anything more was owed to them. They didn't understand what their 
rights were, that's why they hired an attorney to find out. Their understanding was 
entirely based on what their counsel told them. That's telling us that no worker 
understood what their rights were under the conditions of the USX plant closing down. 
Everyone thought their attorney was telling the truth. The attorney has a duty to tell them 
and they had the right to rely on their counsel's words. 
Now Judge Roth is trying to say that the steelworkers could have known. Could 
the steelworkers have read the BLA? Could they have known? No, because they didn't 
know what it would mean when a plant closes down. The steelworkers don't understand 
complex contracts, they are steelworkers, but even for those who could read, the facts of 
the situation were hidden from them. 
The Statute of Limitations (SOL) issue has so little weight compared to the 
damage that has been done by these criminal attorneys and is so small in comparison that 
the weight of the damages far out weighs the question of SOL (if any). For Judge Roth to 
put so much weight on SOL after all this litigation work right at the moment the Plaintiffs 
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prove their position is an injustice being committed on a technicality to avoid the truth. 
Supreme court case law says that is not supposed to happen. 
So Judge Roth did not correct any of the errors that Pat Brian made in his January 
12,2006 and September 27, 2005 memorandums pertaining to vacation pay eligibility, 
forfeiture, nor any other BLA regulation even after Plaintiffs showed to Judge Roth the 
errors. However, Roth did see fit to overturn Pat Brian's December 5,2003 memorandum 
decision on Statute of Limitations that did favor the Plaintiffs. These facts make it 
entirely clear that presuming a conspiracy exists to defeat the Plaintiffs at any turn is not 
only possible, but probable, including unjustly placing a 5th Ace in the deck of cards and 
calling it Statute of Limitations right at the moment when Plaintiffs check mate the 
Defense. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE REILIEF SOUGHT 
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs counsel was entirely deficient and it is this reason the 
Defendants were able to get away with breaking evidence rules, distorting the meaning of 
the Basic Labor Agreement, and fabricating false arguments with no opposition. It is 
possible that Plaintiffs counsel Evan Schmutz was in over his head. Mr. Schmutz 
probably should not have taken on this case and it seems that he may have had trouble 
keeping up with the facts of the case, but prior to withdrawing from the case, Evan 
Schmutz's action could be perceived as having been working to help the other side. The 
reason for this line of thinking is because he did absolutely nothing to stop the Defense in 
the face of what should have been the most obvious weaknesses that if opposed would 
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surely have won Plaintiffs the case. 
Once the Plaintiffs became pro se litigants and although it required some time for 
the pro se Plaintiffs to grasp how poorly this case had been handled and garner an 
understanding for the legal process, in the end, the Plaintiffs had the better legal hand. 
The Defendants had no substantive argument while the Plaintiffs had the facts, the law, 
and the evidence on their side, but for some reason, whatever reason that may be, Judge 
Roth decided to help them escape by entering on his own accord a ruling of statute of 
limitations. Yet if statute of limitations were an issue- it would have and could have been 
decided along time ago. So why did Judge Roth wait until the last minute of the case to 
issue the ruling of statute of limitations, especially after Plaintiffs built the winning 
argument? Because the Defendants had been caught with their hand in the cookie jar so to 
speak. The Defendants lost this case as a matter of law and they knew it. Judge Roth 
knew it also. So why did Roth help them escape? Was it to help big name lawyers save 
face? We the Plaintiffs do not know that answer and can only speculate, but what we do 
know is that Judge Rothfs ruling was entirely unfair and unjust. Statute of Limitations had 
already been decided upon in the Federal Court and for Roth to use that as an escape 
hatch for the Defendants was not only an unjustified overturning of a Federal Ruling by 
the lower court, but was another of the many dishonest and unfair actions toward pro se 
Plaintiffs. The Defendants thought they could easily defeat the Plaintiffs and never 
thought the Plaintiffs would be able to figure out the dirty tricks the Defendants were 
attempting. 
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It is not fair that the pro se Plaintiffs went through so much energy and effort to get 
to the truth and then once they succeeded at recovering and winning a portion of this case 
as a matter of law, that the win should be stolen from them under the guise of statute of 
limitations. The Plaintiffs won this case; the Defendants know it and Judge Roth knows 
it. An honest study of the material will conclude the Plaintiffs did win as fact. 
The reason that the Plaintiffs motion to reconsider, motion for new trial, and 
objections to the dirty tricks, errors in law, and rules of evidence violations were ignored 
is because to address them and argue them would mean certain loss for the Defendants. 
Statute of Limitations was the 5th Ace in the deck of cards. It was their way to "use the 
law to defeat the law"; also an illegality. It seems that these Defendants can't win 
anything without cheating. 
As remedy to the Plaintiffs horribly deficient representation, as a solution to the 
near (in not) criminal defendants, as a reward to pro se Plaintiffs who stuck to it and 
established the truth as a matter of law, Plaintiffs propose to this Court the following 
possible forms of relief: 
Option 1: An entirely new trial. Because Plaintiffs now understand all the tricks played 
by the Defendants, and because Plaintiffs now have a functional understanding of the 
legal process, pro se Plaintiffs should be able to wrap this case up fairly quickly in a new 
trial. 
Option 2: Summary judgment favoring Plaintiffs on the vacation pay issue and a New 
Trial on all remaining issues. 
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Option 3: Because Defendants never produced a single authenticated accounting record, 
it would be proper for summary judgment favoring plaintiffs on all issues pertaining to 
this lawsuit 
Supplement to option 3: In addition to Option 3, it would be very pleasing to Plaintiffs 
that they could have a New Trial on the Lost increased pensions issue because their 
counsel failed to include it as a form of relief in the original complaint. 
Plaintiffs are seeking relief by the lower court reversing and favoring Plaintiffs on 
the vacation pay issue, and on the lost wages issue. Plaintiffs are also seeking a new trial 
on the breach of fiduciary duty issue pertaining to increased pensions or a new trial on all 
issues. Or summary judgment from the appeals court on the vacation pay issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this December 2008. 
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Addendum A 
UCC §2-106(3) (Contracts) Al 
ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) §502 Al 
BLA §12-A-l-b (Vacation Pay Eligibility Requirements) A2 
BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeiture clause for vacation pay) A3 
BLA § 8-A and 8-B (Suspension and Discharge Procedures) A4 - A5 
UCC 2-106(3) 
"Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement 
or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On "termination" 
all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right 
based on prior breach or performance survives. 
29 U.S.C. 1132. Civil enforcement 
(ERISA sec. 502(a)) 
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action 
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
• (A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or 
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, 
to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or 
to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan; 
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief 
under section 1109 of this title; 
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 
• (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan, or 
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 
• (i) to redress such violations or 
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan; 
(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of 
a violation of 1025(c) of this title; 
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by the Secretary 
• (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter, 
or 
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief 
• (i) to redress such violation or 
(ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter; or 
(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (c)(2) or (i) or (1) of this 
section. 
Al 
BLA §12-A-l-b (Vacation Pay Eligibility Requirements) 
Section 12 — Vacations 
. preceding the weekly pay period in which the 
Holiday occurs. 
7„ If an eligible employee performs work on a 11.20 
Holiday, but works less than 8 hours, he^hall 
be entitled to the benefits of this Subsection xo \\.,, 1 
the extent that the number of hours worked by 
him on the Holiday is less than 8. This Subsec-^  
Hon applies in addition to the provisions of 
Subsection E of Section 10, where applicable. 
E. Nonduplication 
1. Payment of overtime rates shall not be 11.21 
duplicated for the same hours worked, but the 
higher of the applicable rates shall be used.. 
Hours compensated for at overtime rates shall 
not be counted further for any purpose in deter-
mining overtime liability under the same or any 
other provisions, provided, however, that a 
Holiday, whether worked or not, shall be 
counted for purposes of computing overtime 
liability under the provisions of Subsection 
C-l-c,-d, or -e above and hours worked on a 
Holiday shall be counted for purposes of com-
puting overtime liability under the provisions 
of Subsection C-l-a above. 
2. Except as above provided, hours paid for but 11.22 
not worked shall not be counted in determin-
ing overtime liability. 
SECTION 12 ~ VACATIONS 
A. Eligibility 
1. To be eligible for a vacation in any calendar 12.1 
year during the term of "this Agreement, the 
employee must: 
a. Have one year or more of continuous ser- 12.2 
vice; and 
b. Not have been absent from work for six 12.3 
consecutive months or more in the preceding 
calendar year; except that in case of an 
employee who completes one year of con-
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Section 12 — Vacations (Contd.) 
tinuous service in such calendar year, he. shall 
; I _ not have been absent from work for six con-
secutive months or more during the 12 
months following the date of his original 
P ;^ j ern$byment; provided, that an employee 
witn more than one year of continuous 
service who in any year shall be ineligible for 
a vacation by reason of the provisions of this 
paragraph as a result of an absence on 
account of layoff or illness shall receive one 
week's vacation with pay in such year if he 
shall not have been absent from work for six 
consecutive months or more in the 12 con-
secutive calendar months next preceding 
such vacation. Any period of absence of an 
employee while on vacation pursuant to this 
Section or while absent due to a compensable 
disability in the year in which he incurred 
such disability, or while in military service 
in the year of his reinstatement to employ-
ment, shall be deducted in determining the 
length of a period of absence from work for 
the purposes of this Subsection A-l-b. 
2. Continuous service shall date from: (a) the 12.4 
date of first employment at the plant (in the case 
of transferred employees from any plant listed 
in Appendix B the date shall be the date of first 
employment at the planf from which first 
transferred); or (b) subsequent date of employ-
ment following a break in continuous service, 
whichever of the above two dates is the later. 
Such continuous service shall be. calculated in 
the same manner as the calculation of con-
tinuous service s&t forth in Subsection C, 
Section 13 — Seniority, of this Agreement 
except that there shall be no accumulation of 
service in excess of the first two years 'of any 
continuous period of absence on account of 
layoff or physical disability (except, in the case 
of compensable disability, as provided in 
Subsection C-4, Section 13 — Seniority) in the 
calculation of service for vacation eligibility. 
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BLA §12-A-3 (Forfeiture clause for vacation pay) 
^ 
Section 12 — Vacations (Contd.) 
3. An employee, even though otherwise eligible 12.5 
under this Subsection A, forfeits the right to 
receive vacation benefits under this Section if 
he quits, retires, dies, or is discharged prior to 
January 1 of the vacation year. 
Length of Vacation *;;li 
Effective for calendar year 1987, an eligible i2.6UVl 
employee who has attained the years of con-
tinuous service indicated in the following table 
in calendar year 1987 shall receive a vacation 
corresponding to such years of continuous ser-
vice as shown in the following table: 
B. 
1. 
Years of Service 
1 but less than 3 
3 but less than 17 
17 but less than 25 
25 or more 
Weeks of Vacation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Effective for calendar year 1988, an 12.7 
eligible employee who had attained the 
years of continuous service indicated in 
the following table In any calendar year 
during the continuation of this Agreement 
shall receive a vacation corresponding to 
such years of continuous service as shown 
in the following table: 
Years of Service 
1 but less than 3 
3 but less than 10 
10 but less than 17 
17 but less than 25 
25 or more 
Weeks of Vacation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
3, A week of vacation shall consist of 7 con- 12.8 
secutrve days. 
C. Scheduling of Vacations 
1. General 
a.. On or promptly after October 1 of each year, 12.9 
each employee entitled or expected to 
become entitled to take vacation time off in 
90 
Section 12 — Vacations (Contd.) 
the following year will be requested to 
specify in writing (not later than 30 days 
•afterAe receipt of such request), on a form 
[provided by the Company, the vacation 
period or periods he desires. 
i »\!s Vty Notice^will b^given an employee at least 60 12.10 
1
 uayi in atcfvanfce of the date his vacation 
period is scheduled to start, but in any event 
•notlatenihan January 1 of the year in which 
the vacation is to be taken. 
c. Vacations will, so far as practicable, be 12.11 
granted at times most desired by employees 
(longer service employees being given 
preference as to choice); but the final right 
to allot vacation periods and to change such 
allotments is exclusively reserved to the 
Company in order to insure the orderly 
operation of the plants. 
d. Any employee absent from work because of 12.12 
layoff, disability or leave of absence at the 
time employees are requested to specify the 
vacation periods they desire and who has not 
previously requested and been allotted a 
vacation period for the calendar year, may 
be notified by Management that a period is 
being allotted as his vacation period but that 
he has the right within 14 days to request 
some other vacation period. If any such 
employee notifies Management in writing, 
within 14 days after such notice k sent, that 
he desires some other vacation period, he 
shall be entitled to have his vacation 
scheduled in accordance with paragraph 
C-l-c, 
e. If an employee is on layoff from tho plant 12.13 
at any time before the beginning of his 
scheduled vacation hereunder, he may re-
quest to have his vacation start at any time 
during such layoff and if Management 
agrees to grant his request, it shall have the 
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BLA § 8-A and 8-B (Suspension and Discharge Procedures) 
(parti) 
Section 8 — Suspension and Discneige Csses 
developed by the parties before and at the 
hearing and shall include a brief written 
explanation of the basis for his conclusion. 
These decisions shall not be cited as a precedent 
in any discussion at any step of the grievance 
or arbitration procedure. The authority of the 
arbitrator shall be the same as that provided in 
Sections 7-A z.nd 5 of the Agreement. 
4, Any grievance appealed to this expedited ar- 7.31 
bitration procedure must be confined to issues 
which do not involve novel problems and which 
have limited contractual significance or com-
plexity. If the Union appeals a grievance to 
Jhe Board of Arbitration under cir-
cumstances where !t Is clear from the 
Issue embodied in the grievance that 
jurisdiction io resolve the grievance lies 
solely within the expedited arbitration pro-
cedure and should the Board conclude 
that It lacks jurisdiction over the grievance, 
the Union, after such award, may not 
thereafter appeal such grievance to 
expedited arbitration; provided, however, 
that it it is unclear from the issue 
embodied in such grievance whether 
jurisdiction io resolve the grievance !!es 
solely within the expedited arbitration pro-
cedure, bat the Board concludes that !t 
Sacks jurisdiction, the Union may appeal 
such grievance to expedited arbitration 
within ten (10) days of the date of such 
award. 
SECTION 8 — SUSPENSION AND 
DISCHARGE CASES 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of this Section is to provide for the 8.1 
disposition of complaints involving suspension or 
discharge and to establish a special procedure for 
the prompt review of cases invoiving discharge or 
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suspension of more than 4 calendar days. Com-
plaints concerning suspensions of 4 calendar days 
or less shall be handled in accordance with Section 
o — Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances, 
Section 7 — Arbitration, and Appendix J — 
Grievance and Arbitration. Complaints concerning 
suspension? of 5 calendar days or more and 
discharges shall be handled in accordance >vi£h the 
procedure set forth below, including Section 6 — 
Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances, Section 
7 — Arbitration, and Appendix J — Grievance and 
Arbitration. 
B* Procedure 
An employee shai! not be peremptorily dis- SJS 
charged. In all cases in which Management may 
conclude that an employee's conduct may justify 
suspension or discharge, he shall be suspended 
initially for not more than 5 calendar days, and 
given written notice of such action. In all cases of 
discharge, or of suspension for any period of time, 
s copy of the discharge or suspension notice shall 
be promptly furnished io such employee's grievance 
committeeman. 
If such initial suspension is for not more than 4 8.3 
calendar days and the employee affected believes 
that he has been unjustly dealt with, he may initiate 
a complaint and have it processed in accordance 
with Section 6 — Adjustment of Complaints and • 
Grievances, Section 7 —Arbitration, and Appendix 
J — Grievance and Arbitration, 
if such initial suspension is for 5 calendar days BA 
and if the employee affected believes he has been 
unjustly dealt with, he may request and shall be 
granted, during this period, a hearing and a state-
ment of the offense before a representative (statu,? 
of department head or higher) designated by the 
genera! manager of the plant with or without an 
assistant grievance committeeman or grievance 
committeeman present as the employee may choose. 
At such hearing the facts concerning the case shall 
be made available to both parties. After such hear-
51 
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ing, or if no such hearing is requested, Management 
may conclude whether the suspension shall be 
affirmed, modified, extended, revoked, or con-
verted into a discharge. In the event the suspension 
is affirmed, modified, extended, or converted into 
a discharge, the employee may, within 5 calendar 
days after notice of such action, file a grievance in 
the Second Step of the complaint and grievance 
procedure. Final decision shall be made by the Com-
pany in this Step within 5 calendar days from the 
date of the filing thereof- Such grievance shall 
thereupon be handled in accordance with the pro-
cedures of Section 6 — Adjustment of Complaints 
and Grievances, Section 7 — Arbitration, and 
Appendix J — Grievance and Arbitration. 
Grievances involving discharge which are appealed 
to the Board shall be docketed, heard, and decided 
within sixty (60) days of appeal, unless the Board 
determines that circumstances require otherwise. 
Such grievances shall be identified by the Union as 
discharge grievances in the appeal to the Board. 
An initial suspension for not more than 4 8 5 
calendar days to be extended or converted into a 
discharge must be so extended or converted within 
the 4-day period, in which case the procedure out-
lined in the immediately preceding paragraph shall 
be followed and the 5-calendar-day period for re-
questing a hearing shall begin when the employee 
receives notice of such extension or discharge. 
The Company in arbitration proceedings will 8 8 
not make use of any personnel records of previous 
disciplinary action against the employee involved 
where the disciplinary action occurred five or more 
years prior to the date of the event which is the sub-
ject of such arbitration. 
An employee who is summoned to meet in an 8.7 
office with a supervisor other than his own im-
mediate supervisor for the purpose of discussing 
possible disciplinary action shall be entitled to be 
accompanied by his grievance committeeman or 
assistant grievance committeeman if he requests 
( Section 8 — Suspension and Discharge Cases (Contd.) 
j such representation, provided suchrepresentative 
; is then available, and provided further that, if such 
« representative is not then available, the employee's 
required attendance at such meeting shall be defer-
red only for such time during that shift as is 
necessary to provide opportunity for him to secure 
the attendance of such representative. 
C. Revocation of Suspensions 
or Discharges 
Should any initial suspension, or affirmation, 8.8 
modification, or extension thereof, or discharge be 
revoked by the Company, the Company shall 
reinstate and compensate the employee affected on 
the basis of an equitable lump sum payment 
mutually agreed to by the parties or, in the absence 
of agreement, make him whole in the manner set 
forth in Section 8-D below. 
D. Jurisdiction of the Board 
Should it be determined by the Board that an 8.9 
employee has been suspended or discharged without 
proper cause therefor, the Company shall reinstate 
the employee and make him whole for the period 
of his suspension or discharge, which shall include 
providing him such earnings and other benefits as 
he would have received except for such suspension, 
or discharge, and offsetting such earnings or other 
amounts as he would not have received except for 
such suspension or discharge. In suspension and 
discharge cases only, the Board may, where cir-
cumstances warrant, modify or eliminate the offset 
of such earnings or other amounts as would not 
have been received except for such suspension or 
discharge. 
Should it be determined by the Board that an 8.10 
employee has been suspended or discharged for 
proper cause therefor, the Board shall not*Tiave 
jurisdiction to modify the degree of discipline im-
posed by the Company; provided, however, that in 
a discharge case arising out of a strike or work stop-
page the Board shall have discretion, if it finds that 
the Company has proper cause for discipline but 
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Exhibit B 
otherwise reasonably discoverable, "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not 
prevent the running of the statute of limitations." Williams, 970 P.2d at 1284 (Utah 1998) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The undisputed facts show that plaintiffs were in possession of sufficient facts to give them 
notice of their damages when they received their final settlement checks~the point at which their 
cause of action accrued; and they had sufficient information to attribute such damages to breaches 
of duty by defendants at the same time. While a determination whether a discovery exception is 
applicable is usually "highly fact-dependent" and precludes summary judgment "in all but the 
clearest of cases" (In the matter of the MalualaniB. Hoopiiaina Trusts v. Hoopiiainay2005 UT App. 
272, TPp3-24), plaintiffs here have not provided any evidence that actions of the defendants 
prevented the discovery of the plaintiffs1 cause of action. Similarly, the plaintiffs have not shown 
that they did not know and could not reasonably have discovered and filed their claims against the 
defendants within the statutory period. See Russell Packard Development, 2005 UT 14, at %26). 
The exception to the statute of limitation they seek to employ is a discovery rule; it requires 
those who seek its protection to show that certain evidence necessary to establish one or more of the 
elements of their claim for relief was concealed from them, and that reasonably diligent plaintiffs 
in their circumstances would not have discovered such evidence until too late to file a claim within 
the statute of limitations period, given the defendants' actions. See Alfred^ 2008 UT 22, at |36 (for 
the discovery exception to apply, plaintiffs must first show that they "did not know and could not 
reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action 
within [the limitations period]" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Yet plaintiffs have 
not identified any pertinent material evidence that was discovered only after the passage of the 
limitations period and that could not have been discovered earlier with the use of reasonable 
diligence. Even where fraudulent concealment is alleged, summary judgment is appropriate where 
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"the facts underlying the allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or 
insufficiently established that... the claim fails as a matter of law." Russell Packard Development, 
2005 UT 14, at 139. Such is the case here. 
The court concludes that, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 
either before or during the limitations period, they had sufficient information that, had they "acted 
in a reasonable and diligent manner," they could timely have filed their case. The court further 
concludes that plaintiffs have not bom the burden of establishing a question of material fact as to 
the application of either the concealment prong or the exceptional circumstances prong of the 
discovery exception to the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs did not file suit within the four-year 
limitations period, and they have failed to show that "given the defendants'] actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have brought suit within the statutory period." See Russell Packard 
Development, 2005 UT 14, at [^26. 
2. Exceptional Circumstances. 
The exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule does not require a showing of 
concealment, "Under this doctrine, the limitations period is tolled where there are exceptional 
circumstances such that the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless 
of any showing that the defendant... prevented the discovery of the cause of action." Alfred, 2008 
UT 22, at 1f36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Williams, 970 P.2d at 1285. 
The special circumstances plaintiffs appear to assert implicate their status as a "collectively 
• . . undereducated group of skilled and unskilled laborers, many of whom were unable to read 
effectively," who, as laymen, "depended entirely on Defendants, as their legal counsel, for advice 
and information about the nature and extent of their rights and entitlements regarding the settlement 
proceed[s]." Plaintiffs Memorandum, at 26. In this regard, plaintiffs assert that they could not be 
expected to have discerned problems with defendants' "dissemination of work history and other 
-40-
information/* have "ascertained the existence of actual and legal injury, or have known about 
"professional standards and practices among attorneys when accounting for and distributing 
settlement funds'* or "their legal right to demand a fair and principled distribution of settlement 
funds, base on their individual circumstances." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, at 26, 
Like the concealment prong of the discovery exception, however, "[fjor this exception to 
apply, an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have 
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within [the 
limitations period]." Alfred, 2008 UT 22, at ^ [36 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
As discussed above, plaintiffs have failed to make this initial showing. 
3. Conclusion. 
Finally, plaintiffs have presented no evidence pointing to any particular "discovery," 
occurring after the passage of the statutory period, when knowledge of a recently discovered fact 
completed the puzzle and thereby allowed a plaintiff at some identifiable point to realize that 
defendants had wronged him or her, a realization that had not reasonably been possible at an earlier 
time due to concealment or exceptional circumstances. This complete failure to identify a particular 
event or moment when they finally discovered facts indicating that defendants had breached a duty 
in setting up the hearing process makes it impossible to discern the point in time, that the plaintiffs 
claim that the statute of limitations should have begun to run, if not at the time the Hearing Award 
Decision was issued or the final settlement checks distributed. 
Like the plamtiff in Williams\ plaintiffs here do not "offer a reasonable explanation as to why 
[they]-either pro se or with assistance of legal counsel-could not have filed an action against [the 
defendants] at some time between" March 1996 and March 2000. Williams, 970 P.2d at 1286. 
Without such a showing, plaintiffs have failed to present a viable case for application of either the 
-41-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR S.ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
RONALD J. CHILTON, et al} : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, (Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) 
vs. Case No. 03010588^ 
: (Previous Case No. 020404957) 
ALLEN K.YOUNG,*/a/,. 
Defendants. ; Judge PAT B. BRIAN 
The above matter came before the Court for status hearing on September 22,2003. At 
that hearing, the parties informed the Court that AJlen K. Young's (Defendant) motion to dismiss 
was pending and was ready for decision on the papers. Upon review of the parties filings, 
applicable statutes and case law, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss, which this 
Court treated as a motion for summary judgment, based on following decision. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs filed this law suit against their former attorney alleging legal malpractice and 
fraudulent misrepresentation in Irrigation against Plaintiffs former employer. A motion to 
dismiss admits the facts as pleaded in the complaint as true, therefore, the following facts are 
derived from the comptamt. The 124 Plaintiffs are all former employees of the Orem facility of 
United States Steel corporation ("USX*') who were laid off during a "hot idle" period. On behalf 
of Plaintiffs as their attorney, Defendant caused to filed a law suit against USX, Pickering v. USX 
Corporation, (federal case) in the United S rates District Conrt which was assigned to Judae 
Bruce S. Jenkins (Judge Jer&ins). One of the many issues in the federal case was whether 
Plaintiffs were entitled to a monetary award for \acation pay for the 1988 calendar year.* 
in the tederal case, some piamtins were aesignaieu as ueiiwouuei piamiuis. iviairy ui 
the issues involving the beilweather plaintiffs were heard and determined on the merits. For 
example. Judse Jenkins awarded beilweather plaintiff William Thomas back pay, wases, sick 
pav, vacation pay, incentive pay and other employee compensation^y^t9^tkey:Qmp^§atipn he 
would have received during the idling period less any amount of income earned b^hyaJitough 
employment during the same period* 
Subsequently, Defendant negotiated a proposed settlement of the USX case with the USX 
defendants. Defendant addressed the terms of the proposed settlement with Plaintiffs at a 
meeting held on June 28, 1995 at Mountain View High School in Orem. Utah (meeting). At the 
meeting, Defendant represented to Plaintiffs that the proposed settlement would sive theip 
everything Judge Jenkins had awarded the beilweather plaintiffs. ,sIn reliance upon Defendant's 
representation that they would receive what the bellweatiier plaintiffs had received, the Plaintiffs 
accepted the proposed settlement upon the terms suggested to them by Defendant at the meeting. 
Defendant obtained releases for any liability as a result of the settlement achieved in the 
federal case. Plaintiffs executed the releases in reliance upon the representations made to them in 
the meeting. Defendant's representations made to Plaintiffs at the meeting were false because 
they did not receive vacation pay for 1988 like some of the beilweather plaintiffs. 
- j . r M . ^ ^ H ^ / - ' ' 
On November 5, 2002, Plaintiffs filed the present law suit alleging causes of action 
against Defendant for (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, (2) legal malpractice - breach of contract, 
(3) legal malpractice - breach of fiduciary duty and (4) legal malpractice - negligence.1 
1
 The Court notes that the law suit was filed in the Fourth District Court. However, the 
Fourth District Court was recused from the case by its presiding judge and the case was 
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On December 16, 2002, Defendant filed the present motion to dismiss claiming that 
Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the statute of 
limitations has run on all of Plaintiffs causes of action. On January 2. 2003, Plaintiffs filed their 
opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. Oh January 15, 2003, Defendant filed his reply to 
Plaintiffs opposition. 
On September 22,2003, a status hearing was held and the parties informed the Court that 
the motion to dismiss was ready for decision on the papers. 
On November 14, 2003, Ronald Chilton (Chilton), one of the plaintiffs, filed a letter 
stating that he was concerned about the status of the case and the representation by his counsel. 
Chilton argues that the Plaintiffs could not have discovered Defendant's alleged fraud until a trial 
in the Chamberlaia/Young case in April and May of 2001, Chilton states that Judge Scott 
Daniels stated in his opinion after reading Judge Jenkins ruling that Young owed vacation pay to 
all Plaintiffs in the Pickering/USX case. 
LAW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides a court may dismiss a cause of action if a party fails to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss "admits the 
facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.y 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). If matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, then the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Utah R. 
transferred to the Third District Court and assigned to the West Valley Department. 
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Here. Plaintiffs opposition and the letter from a single Plaintiff were submitted. These 
were not excluded by the Court, therefore, the Court treats the motion as a motion for summary 
judgment. 
Rule 56(c) provides a court may grant summary judgment if no genuine issues of material 
fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court shall view 
all facts in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Generally, a statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action arises. 
Davidson Lumber v. Bonneville /m>.? 794 P.2d 11,19 (Utah 1990). However, the judicially 
created equitabie "exceptional circumstances'* rule permits the discovery rule to toll the statute of 
limitations. Sevy v. Security Title Co.y 902 P.2d 629 (Utahi995); see also Sevey v. Security Title 
Co., 857 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The discovery rule is that a party shall exercise 
reasonable diligence to discover a cause of action against defendants or the cause of action shall 
be barred by the statute of limitations. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 294 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 provides a three year statute of limitations in cases of fraud 
and begins to accrue when aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake may be 
reasonably discovered. Plaintiffs are required to exercise "reasonable diligence" in discovering 
fraud. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993). A cause of action for breach of contract 
shall be filed within six years of the breach. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23; see also Butcher v. 
Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Causes of action for negligence and breach of 
-4-
fiduciary duty shall be filed within four years of ciscovery or me oreacn. uiau v,uuc n±uu % t%>-
12-25. 
ANALYSIS 
Here. Plaintiffs were clients of Defendant attorney in a complex, class action litigation, 
who relied on the advice of counsel. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the 
Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist, therefore. Defendant is not entitled to 
summary judgment. For example, genuine issues of material fact exist with regard to whether 
Plaintiffs made a reasonable effort to discover and when Plaintiffs may have reasonably 
discovered Defendant's fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence and, 
therefore, when the statute of limitations began to accrue. There are insufficient facts before the 
Court to decide as a matter of law that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 
The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss, which this Court treated as a motion 
for summary judgment. 
So ordered this CP day of December, 2003. By the Court; 
—7-*- *$ *•' "<: ?-—*Zl L^./V^TTV
 £ 
PAT B.BRIAN 
Third District Court Judee 
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after this second.phase of trial. See Part VI, infra. 
"Idling0 ("Active" and "Management") Plaintiffs 
As to ihe "Active" and "Management" plaintiffs 
whose pension benefits were impaired by the 
indefinite idling of "Geneva in February 1987, 
following the end of the work stoppage, this Court 
found in Pickering ] that Mthe plaintiffs are entitled 
to continued benefits as if Geneva had not been 
idled at that time. Further, these benefits continued 
to accrue up to <he moment in time in which USX 
lawfully shut down, sold or otherwise disposed of 
Geneva.*' 809 F.Supp.-at 1552. This Court then 
concluded that "the Active and Management 
plaintiffs' damages or measure of relief must be 
measured within the terms of the 1987 BLA 'as if 
they had remained active employees who were 
terminated when Geneva was sold to BM & T in 
August of 1.987." 7rf. Under Pickering I the 
"Idling" plaintiffs' individual jemedies must be 
determined with reference to the seven-month 
"idling" period from February 1. 1987 through 
August 31,1987. 
Plaintiffs 'had* argued for accrual of benefits 
through an assumed shutdown date of October 
.1-989, based upon a public promise made by the 
company's chairman. This Court rejected the 
October 1989 date in Pickering J for the reason that 
USX was not "legally bound by its promise to keep 
Geneva open." Jd. See generally Local 1330, 
Uniied Sieel Workers of America v. United States 
Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.1980) 
(company not bound by public promise to keep 
plant open so long as plant remains profitable). 
This Conn also found that the plaintiffs .had "failed 
to establish a prima facie case" showing that USX 
had sold Geneva to BM & T for the purpose of 
interfering with plaintiffs' anainment of pension 
benefit rights, particularly rights which would 
accrue upon a total plant shutdown. Id. at 1556, 
1558. 
*7 In this second phase of trial, plaintiffs have 
overhauled their argument concerning the sale of 
Geneva to BM & T and the October 1989 date. 
[KN5] Plaintiffs now avej that "but for" the 
indefinite idling of Geneva following the end of the 
work stoppage in 1986—which this Court previously 
found to have been prompted by unlawful motives, 
violating § 510-Geneva would not have been sold 
to BM & T at all. Instead, plaintiffs postulate, 
Copr. <D West 2004 No < 
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Geneva would have resumed normal operations 
and, driven by the demands of Pit-Cal,*would have 
continued operations until at least October of 1989. 
See Part ]V, infra. Plaintiffs suggest that the Court 
need not find that the sale of Geneva was prompted 
by unlawful anti-pension benefit animus in order to 
extend the remedial period under § 510 through the 
October 1989 date. Cf Gaddy v. ABEX Corp., 884 
F.2d 312, 319 (7th Cir.1989); Whajley v. Skaggs 
Companies, Inc., 707 FJ2d 1129, 1138 (10th 
Cir.1983). 
Plaintiffs adamantly insist that the Court address 
the question of the proper remedial period .iji' terms 
of this "but for" analysis, citing cases such as 
Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial- Workers 
lni'1 Union, 993 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir.1993): . 
The purpose of a back pay award is to make the 
employee whole-i.e., restore the economic status 
quo that would have obtained but for the 
wrongdoing on the part of the employer and the 
union.... It is improper, however, to award back 
pay if it can be shown that the employees would 
have lost their jobs at a later date even if they bad 
been 'treated fairly.... The burden is on the 
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that an employee would have been 
discharged or laid off at a later date, or that the 
employee's job would have been phased out, even 
if no [wrongful conduct] had occurred, ... and the 
defendant has a right to present such evidence in 
defending a claim for damages.... 
993 F.2d at 1473 (emphasis added & citations 
omitted). 
"LaRoche" and Idling" Plaintiffs1 Section 204(h) 
Claims 
With respect to the "LaRocbe" and "Idling" 
plaintiffs' claims under § 204(b) of ERISA, this 
Court earlier determined that the appropriate 
remedy would be to compute plaintiffs' pension 
benefits as if the unlawful amendment had not 
occurred. See Pickering Jt 809 F.Supp. at 1564; cf 
Pratt v. Petroleum Prod, Management Employee 
Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, (J0th Cir.1990) ( 
"[subsequent unilateral adoption of an amendment 
which is then used to defeat or diminish the 
plaintiffs fully vested rights under the governing 
plan document is not only ineffective, but also 
arbitrary and capricious."). [FN6] 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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should be calculated on the basis of each plaintiffs' 
income at USX as reflected in USX payroll records 
and utilized by Dr. Randle and Mr. Norman, 
withoui adjustments based upon the BM & T 
experience. 
As to the quesiion of whether Dr. Randle overstates 
plaintiffs' back pay by using 80-plus-hour pay 
periods as a starting point, it almost looks as though 
USX's assertion that plaintiffs1 back pay should be 
computed based upon the historical average of 
hours worked 'during a pay period whipsaws 
plaintiffs between the operation of Geneva absent 
the labor reduction program and the 80- plus-hour 
minimum standard that USX asserts plaintiffs must 
meet in order to show a likelihood of recall. (See 
Tr. '11/4/93, at 287-346 (testimony of David 
Braithwaite).) ]{ one listens to USX on entitlement, 
plaintiffs should only receive back pay for those 
pay periods where there was eighty hours or more 
of work for them to do. If one listenr-to USX on 
amount, back pay. should be computed-on the basis 
that the prevailing plaintiff would have worked less 
than those same eighty-or-more hours. _ 
'Thd Court has considered the eighty-or-more hours 
analysis as a . factor in determining individual 
plaintiffs' entitlement to a remedy for USX's failure 
to recall and it seems fair to evaluate the back pay 
to be* awarded in that same light. [FN48] The Court 
adopts Dr. Randle*s analysis of back pay based 
upon income earned during pay periods in which a 
plaintiff worked 80 or more hours, and rejects Mr. 
Norman's proffered adjustment to base projected 
earnings on actual historical averages. ^^/ 
*43 In' terms of lost employee welfare- benefits, 
such as health or medical insurance coverage lost 
during layoff periods, the Court has concluded that 
recovery under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA for those 
losses should .be limited to out- of-pocket health, 
medical, or insurance premium costs, rather than the 
computed "cost of the benefit" to USX. Cf. Tolan 
v. Levi Strauss A Co., 867 F.2d 467, 470 (8tb 
Cir.1989); Foust v. International Brotherhood oj 
Electrical Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 718 & n. la 
(10th Cir.1978). 
Offsets Against Backpay Awards 
Besides hotly contesting the availability of a back 
.pay remedy under § 502(a)(3) after Mertens, USX 
also claims a series of offsets against any back pay 
Copr. ©West 2004 No C 
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award that this. Court may make in favor of any of 
the bellwether plaintiffs on their § 510 claims. 
(1) Plaintiffs1 Duty to Mitigate 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have a general 
duty to mitigate losses flowing from USX's 
wrongful conduct in failing to recall them to woTk.at 
Geneva following a layoff, or in deciding 10 
"indefinitely idle" the plant following the end of the 
work stoppage in February, 1987. -See, e.g., United 
States v. Lee Way Motor Freight. 6^ 5 F.2d 918? 
936-38 (10th Cir.1979); Equal . Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Sandia Corp., *639 T.26 
600, 627 (10th Cir.1980). They concede that at 
least some, income earned from other employment 
should be offset against amounts of back p'ay 
awarded on'the theory that they should have been 
back to work at Geneva ai the same time, (See Tr. 
10/13/93 (Pretrial .Conference) at 36:12-18 (Mr. 
Orlofsky).) They do assert that the burden of 
proving offsets or a failwe to mitigate falls properly 
upon USX. Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum on 
Legal Issues, dated December 13, 1993 (diet, no, 
758), 'at 381 Following the Title VII analogy, USX 
must show -that ,(1) a particular plaintiff'failed io 
exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate his or her 
damages, and (2) there was a reasonable likelihood 
that the plaintiff * would have found comparable 
work by exercising reasonable diligence. Gaddy v. 
Abex Corp., 884 F.2d 312, 318 (7th Cir.1989); see 
also, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
v. Sandia Corp., 639F.2d at 627. 
(2) Earned Income (Wages, Salary, etc.) 
Plaintiffs', own back pay calculations reileci an 
adjustment for "mitigating income," defined as "all 
income received from employment other than USX 
employment during this period of time, not 
including income earned from investments." (Tr. 
10/19/93, at 489:19*21 (testimony of Di. Paul 
IRandle).) Dr. Randle included vacation pay in his 
calculation of mitigating income. (Id. at 490:14-16. 
5e*PX:546A.) 
Plaintiffs submit that the -proper method for 
calculation of offsets based upon wages, salaries or 
other compensation earned by a particular plaintiff 
during the same period for which he or she receives 
an award of backpay under § 502(a)(3) is the "pay 
period" approach exemplified b}' the National 
Labor Relations Board's formula approved in 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Exhibit E 
Judge Jenkins' Memorandum Decision, May 5,1995, Page 193 
286. The Court finds that Mr. Chrisfophersonrs continuous service at USX adjusted to 
account for the Court's findings herein (viz. an additional seven months (0.58 years), would total 
31/71 years of service, yielding an additional benefit accrual of $1L60. (See DT I32-C; Tr. 
S1/5/93, at 525:1-25 (testimony of Arthur Hallett).) 
287. The Court finds that Mr. Christopheison is eligible to receive a USX "Rule of 65" 
pension immediately upon quitting or otherwise losing Ms employment at BM&T.103 
288. Mr, Christopherson is also entitled to receive retiree medical insurance under the 
Program of Hospital-Medical Benefits for Eligible Pensioners and Surviving Spouses, and USX 
retiree life insurance coverage. (DT 345; Tr. 11/9/93, at 674:11-25 (testimony of William 
Roderick).) 
289. Mr. Christopherson has established his entitlement to "other appropriate equitable 
relief on his claims under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.CA. § 1132(a)(3) (1985) uto redress 
such violations," which includes an award of back pay (wages, sick leave, vacation pay, incentive 
pay or other employee compensation) equal to the compensation he would have received during 
the "idling" period set forth above, less any amount of income earned by him through other 
employment during the same period. 
Pension Remedy - Section 204(h) of ERISA 
290. As a result of Mr. Christopherson^ BM&T service and this Court's ruling under 
Section 204(h), he earned an additional accrued benefit of S130.13 per month- (DT 132-C; Tr. 
11/5/93, at 521:10-528; 11, 591:16-598:16.(testimony of Arthur Hallett).) Mr. Christopherson's 
See also, Defendant's Post-Hearing Memorandum (Damage Phase), dated December 13,1993 (dkL BO. 757), at 
• 1 9 3 -
:died Geneva following the end of the work stoppage, Mr. Vincent would have uccn rtcauea 10 
work on or about February 14, 19S7. 
407. Plaintiffs have established by a jpreponderance of the evidence tkat USX failed xo 
recall employees, including Mr. Vincent, following the end of the work stoppage on February 1, 
198.7, as a proximateconsequence of USXs decision to indefinitely idle Geneva, The intent "to 
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary . . . 
for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may 
become entitled under the plan11 in violation of §51 Oof ERISA, II U.S.C.A. § 1140 (1985), was 
a substantial motivating factor in USX's decision to idle the plant. 
408. Absent an award'of injunctive and "other appropriate equitable relief to plaintiffs 
under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3) (1985), USX would realize substantial 
savings in terms of benefit expenses by reason of its decision to indefinitely idle the Geneva plant 
in 1987. 
Equitable Relief- Section 510 of ERISA 
409. Mr. Vincent has established his entitlement to an order enjoining acts and practices 
of USX which perpetuate its violation of § 510 of ERISA, 11 U.S.CA. § 1140 (1985), and 
requiring that the accraal of pension benefits in favor of Mr. Vincent under the USX pension plan 
be adjusted so as to take into account the reconstruction of his employment history as set .forth 
above. 
410. The Court finds that Mr. Vincent's continuous service at USX, adjusted to account 
for the Court's findings herein (viz. an additional seven monthsf (0.58 years)),W>uld total 19.0 
years of service, yielding an additional benefit accrual of SI 1.78. (See DT 132-C.) 
- 2 3 1 -
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199*5 WL 584372 
(Cite as: J 995 WL 584372 (D.Utah)) 
USX's decision to idle the plant. 
*139 408. Absent an award of injunctive and 
"other appropriate equitable relief1 to plaintiffs 
under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 
1132(a)(3) (1985), USX would realize substantial 
savings in terms of benefit expenses by reason of its 
decision to indefinitely idle the Geneva plant in 
1987. 
Equitable Relief-Section 510 of ERJSA 
409. Mr. Vincent has established his entitlement to 
an order enjoining acts and practices of USX which 
perpetuate its violation of § 510 of ERISA, 11 
U.S.C.A. § 1340 (1985), and requiring that the 
accrual of pension benefits in favor of Mr. Vincent 
under the USX pension plan be adjusted so as to 
take into account the reconstruction of his 
employment history as set forth above. " "^ 
410. The Court finds that Mr. Vincent's continuous 
service at USX, adjusted to account for the Court's 
findings herein (viz. an additional seven months 
(0.58 years)), would total 19.0 years of service, 
yielding, an additional benefit accrual of $11.78. ( 
&*DT132-C.) 
/incent has established his entitlement to 
"other appropriate equitable relief* on his claims 
under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.CA. § 
1132(a)(3) (1985) "to* redress such violations," 
which includes an award of back pay (wages, sick 
leave, vacation pay, incentive pay oi other 
employee compensation) equal to the compensation 
he would have received during the "Idling** period 
set forth above, less any amount of income earned 
by hinr through other employment during the same 
period. 
Pension Remedy-Section 204(h) of ERISA 
432. As a result of Mr. Vincent's BM & T service 
and this Court's ruling under Section 204(h), he 
earned an additional accrued benefit of $109.91 per 
month. (DT 132-C) Mr. Vincent's balance in the 
BM & T pension plan as of February 1, 1993, was 
$8,989.09. (DT 307-C) At the time of Mr. 
Vincent's retirement under the terms of the USX 
pension plan, his accrued benefit of $109.91 per 
month, reduced to present value, will be offset by 
the amount of his account balance in the BM & T 
pension plan as of February 1, 1993, plus interest 
up to the date of his retirement. 
LAROCHE PLAINTIFF 
Rex Christensen 
413. Mr. Christensen was born on August 15, 1934 
and began his employment with USX on October 
20,1954. (PTO Uncontroverted Facts ? 137.) 
414. Mr. Christensen is a Count IX-LaRoche 
plaintiff. While at USX he worked, primarily as an 
operator and laborer, he is a union represented 
employee. (PTO at 5; PTO Uncontroverted Facts 
1138.) 
415. Mr. Christensen was transferred to LaRoche 
Industries upon sale of the nitrogen- facilities by 
USX to LaRoche Industries. He has continued his 
employment at LaRoche as a laborer since the time 
of the sale. .Throughout his employment at 
LaRoche, Mr. Christensen has been a participant in 
the retirement and other employee benefit plans 
offered at LaRoche. He is eligible for a 30- year 
sole option pension. (PTO Uncontroverted Facts H 
139.) 
ANALYSIS 
The -parties agree that Mr. Christensen's only 
remaining claim in this case is under ERJSA § 
204(h). (PTO Uncontroverted Facts % 140.) He 
claims the presenl value of six years' accrual under 
the USX pension plan. (Tr. 10/13/93 (Pretrial 
Conference) at 64.) 
*320 USX argues that Mr. Chrisiensen is not 
entitled to any remedy under § 204(h) of ERJSA 
because the accrued benefit he earned under the 
USX pension plan during his employment at 
LaRoche through February 1, 1993 was less than 
the accrued pension benefit earned under the 
LaRoche pension plan during that time. (DT 
132-B, at 2; DT 132-C; Tr. 11/5/93, at 
519:5-521:9 (testimony of Arthur Hallen).) It may 
be more accurate to say that Mr. Christensen is 
entitled to the additional accruals under § 204(h), 
subject to offsetting accruals under the LaRoche 
plan. According to Arthur Hallett, assuming Mr. 
Christensen retired during November 3993 "(t]he 
result would be that the $139.52 [USX accrual) 
would be totally offset by the $152.75 [LaRoche 
accrual). And USX's obligation would be to pay 
Copr. O West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
http://prim.westlawxoni^ 5/13/2004 
Exhibit F 
Section 12 — Vacations (Contd,) 
3. An employee, even though otherwise eligible 1ZS 
under this Subsection A, forfeits the right to 
receive vacation benefits under this Section if 
he quits, retires, dies, or is discharged prior to 
January 1 of the vacation year. 
B. Length of Vacation ?n 
1. Effective for calendar year 1987, an eligible 12.6^' 
employee who has attained the years of con-
tinuous service indicated in the following table 
in calendar year 1987 shall receive a vacation 
corresponding to such years of continuous ser-
vice as shown in the following table: 
Years of Service Weeks of Vacation 
1 but less than 3 1 
3 but less than 17 2 
17 but less than 25 3 
25 or more 4 
2. Effective for calendar year 1988, an 12.7 
eligible employee who had attained the 
years of continuous service indicated in 
the following table in any calendar year 
during the continuation of this Agreement 
shall receive a vacation corresponding to 
such years of continuous service as shown 
in the following table: 
Years of Service Weeks of Vacation 
1 but less than 3 1 
3 but less than 10 2 
10 but less than 17 3 
17 but less than 25 4 
25 or more 5 
3. A week of vacation shall consist of 7 con- 12.8 
secutive days. 
C. Scheduling of Vacations 
1. General 
a. On or promptly after October 1 of each year, 12.9 
each employee entitled or expected to 
become entitled to take vacation time off in 
90 
I Section 12 — Vacations (Contd.) 
! the following year will be requested to 
I specify in writing (not later than 30 days 
'
 #after^he receipt of such request), on a form 
'provided by the Company, the vacation 
I period or periods he desires. 
\j J* N l'b: Notice^ wUI be given an employee at least 60 12.1 
| * tfayrin acfvanbk of the date his vacation 
period is scheduled to start, but in any event 
not4ater. than January 1 of the year in which 
the vacation is to be taken. 
| c. Vacations will, so far as practicable, be 1Z1 
granted at times most desired by empioyees 
(longer service employees being given 
preference as to choice); but the final right 
to allot vacation periods and to change such 
allotments is exclusively reserved to the 
Company in order to insure the orderly 
operation of the plants. 
d* Any employee absent from work because of 12.1: 
layoff, disability or leave of absence at the 
time employees are requested to specify the 
vacation periods they desire and who has not 
previously requested and been allotted a 
I vacation period for the calendar year, may 
| be notified by Management that a period is 
| being allotted as his vacation period but that 
he has the right within 14 days to request 
some other vacation period. If any such 
employee notifies Management in writing, 
within 14 days after such notice is sent, that 
he desires some other vacation period, he 
shall be entitled to have his vacation 
scheduled in accordance with paragraph 
C-l-c. 
e. If an employee is on layoff from the plant 12,13 
at any time before the beginning of his 
scheduled vacation hereunder, he may re-
quest to have his vacation start at any time 
during such layoff and if Management 
agrees to grant his request, it shall haye the 
91 
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Section 12 — Vacations 
SECTION 12 — VACATIONS 
A. Eligibility 
L To be eligible for a vacation in any calendar 12.1 
year during the term of this Agreement, the 
employee must: 
a. Have one year or more of continuous ser- 12.2 
vice; and 
b. Not have been absent from work for six 12.3 
consecutive months or more in the preceding 
calendar year; except that in case of an 
employee who completes one year of con-
88 
Section 12 -«- Vacations (Contd.) 
tinuous service in such calendar year, h$ shall 
C: I . ^ not haye been absent from work for six con-
secutive months or more during the 12 
months following the date of his original 
py' I cmblbyment; provided, that an employee 
;
 wita more than one year of continuous 
service who in any year shall be ineligible for 
' " a Vacation by reason of the provisions of this 
paragraph as a result of an absence on 
account of layoff or illness shall receive one 
week's vacation with pay in such year if he 
shall not have been absent from work for six 
consecutive months or more in the 12 con-
secutive calendar months next preceding 
such vacation. Any period of absence of an 
employee while on vacation pursuant to this 
Section or while absent due to a compensable 
disability in the year in which he incurred 
such disability, or while in military service 
in the year of his reinstatement to employ-
ment, shall be deducted in determining the 
length of a period of absence from work for 
the purposes of this Subsection A-l-b. 
2. Continuous service shall date from: (a) the 12.4 
date of first employment at the plant (in the case 
of transferred employees from any plant listed-
in Appendix B the date shall be the date of first 
employment at the plant* from which first 
transferred); or (b) subsequent date of employ-
ment following a break in continuous service, 
whichever of the above two dates is the later. 
Such continuous service shall be calculated in 
the same manner as the calculation of con-
tinuous service set forth in Subsection C, 
Section 13 — Seniority, of this Agreement 
except that there shall be no accumulation of 
service in excess of the first two years *of'any 
continuous period of absence on account of 
layoff or physical disability (except, in the case 
of compensable disability, as provided in 
Subsection C-4, Section 13 — Seniority) in the 
calculation of service for vacation eligibility, 
B9 
preceding the weekly pay period in which the
 t l 
Holiday occurs. ' . 
7. If an eligible employee performs work on a 11,20 
Holiday, but works less than 8 hours, he^h l^l 
be entitled to the benefits of this Subsectioriib i\. -, V { jj 
the extent that the number of hours worked by J 
him on the Holiday is less than 8. This Subsec-. 
tion applies in addition to the provisions of. j 
Subsection B of Section 10, where applicable. 
E. Nonduplication 
1. Payment of overtime rates shall not be 11.21 
duplicated for the same hours worked, but the 
higher of the applicable rates shall be used. 
Hours compensated for at overtime rates shall 
not be counted further for any purpose in deter-
mining overtime liability under the same or any 
other provisions, provided, however, that a 
Holiday, whether worked or not, shall be 
counted for purposes of computing overtime 
liability under the provisions of Subsection 
(M-c,-d, or -e above and hours worked on a 
Holiday shall be counted for purposes of com-
puting overtime liability under the provisions 
of Subsection C-l-a above. 
2. Except as above provided, hours paid for but 11*22 
not worked shall not be counted in determin-
ing overtime liability. 
Section 8 — Suspension and Discharge Cases 
developed by the parties before and at the 
hearing and shall include a brief written 
explanation of the basis for his conclusion. 
These decisions shall not be eked as a precedent 
in any discussion at any step of the grievance 
or arbitration procedure. The authority of the 
arbitrator shall be the saras as that provided in 
Sections 7-A znd 8 of ^ht Agreement. 
4. Any grievance appealed to this expedited ar- 7/31 
bitration procedure must be confined to issues 
which do not involve novel problems and which 
have limited contractual significance or com-
plexity. If the Union appeals a grievance to 
the Board of Arbitration under a\r* 
cunistances where !t Is clear from the 
issue embodied tn the grievance that 
jurisdiction to resolve the grievance lies 
solely within the expedited arbitration pro-
cedure and should the Board conclude 
that it lacks jurisdiction over the grievance, 
the Union, after such award, may not 
thereafter appeal such grievance to 
expedited arbitration; provided, however, 
that if it is unclear from the issue 
embodied in such grievance whether 
jurisdiction to resolve the grievance lies 
solely within the expedited arbitration pro-
cedure, but the Board concludes that !t 
lacks jurisdiction, the Union may appeal 
such grievance to expedited aifcltratlon 
within ten (10) days of the date of such 
award. 
SECTION 8 — SUSPENSION AND 
DISCHARGE CASES 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of this Section is to provide for the B.1 
disposition of complaints involving suspension or 
discharge and to establish a special procedure for 
the prompt review of cases involving discbarge or 
Section 3 — Suspension and Discharge Cases (Contd,) 
suspension of more than 4 calendar days. Com-
plaints concerning suspensions of 4 calendar days 
or Jess shall be bandied in accordance with Section 
S —- Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances, 
Section 7 — Arbitration, and Appendix J — 
Grievance snd Arbitration. Complaints concerning 
suspensions of 5 calendar days or more and 
discharges shall be handled m accordance with the 
procedure set forth below, including Section 6 — 
Adjustment of Complaints and Grievances, Section 
7—Arbitration, and Appendix J — Grievance and 
Arbitration. 
B. Procedure 
An employee shall not be peremptorily dis-'8.2 
charged. In all cases in which Management may 
conclude that an employee's conduct may justify 
suspension or discharge, he shall be suspended 
initially for not more than 5 calendar days, and 
given written notice of such action. In all cases of 
discharge, or of suspension for any period of time, 
a copy of iht discharge or suspension notice shall 
be promptly furnished to such employee's grievance 
committeeman. 
If such initial suspension is for not more than 4 8.3 
calendar days and the employee affected believes 
that he has be^n unjustly dealt with, he may initiate 
a complaint and have it processed in accordance 
with Section 6 — Adjustment of Complaints and 
Grievances, Section 7 — Arbitration, and Appendix 
J — Grievance and Arbitration. 
If such initial suspension is for 5 calendar days 8.4 
and if the employee affected believes he has been 
unjustly dealt with, he may request and shall be 
granted, during this period, a hearing sad a state-
ment of the offense before a representative (st&vfc 
of department head or higher) designated by the 
general manager of the plant with or without an 
assistant grievance committeeman or grievance 
committeeman present as the employee may choose. 
At such hearing the facts concerning the case shall 
be made available ro both parties. After such hear-
50 51 
8*etfan a — Management 
partleSfirftfa Board of Arbitration or<HQ refer 
the m a w * b a c k *r** p , B n l wJtftout resolu-
tion (9 wKteh event the specific disputes will 
ta» handled under the provisions of this sec-
tion at the time they may arise. 
J, District pimtf or/pompany Labor Rote!{cms 
It la-the totem'of the partes tl>ai the 2.44 
members of the Jol$ plant contracting out 
committee shall .engage in discussions of the 
prohfepi involved jn tfil$ tl$fd In a gqocWaJth 
effort to arrive at mutuaf understanding so 
that dlspMfB^^nd grievance can ba avoided. 
If either the Company or the Union members 
of the committee fool that thJa J$ hot being 
done, they may appeal te'the Dl$trtorOIreoior 
Of the llrtlnn « i ^ •*-* K.J—«--• 
__ .,_ ^rM.r«u> nfmequqrsere for review of 
the complaint e&OMtth© failure of the commit-
tee to proparjy-fifttctfoii, Such appeal shall 
result In a prompt Invest)gat(on fay the District 
Dlrotfpt or His deslgnnted representative and 
the Company's labor relatione representative 
daelgpeted for such review* Thlp provision 
should fn no way affact the rights of the par-
ties to connection with the processing of any 
grievance ^IsJIng to the $utyact of contract* 
ing out. 
8BCTI0N 3 - MANAGEMENT 
The Company retains the exclusive rights to 3-1 
manage th^ business and plants and to direct the 
worlring forces. The Company, ux the exercise of 
tU rights, shall observe the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
The rights to manage the bubiness and plants 3.g 
and to dfosct the working forces include the right 
to hire, suspend or discharge for proper cause* or 
24 
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£*6thHi 4 - BftftpojttlbJHtJea of Ins Pprtto 
transfer, and the right to relieve employees from 
Jtoty because of lackof work or fotf other legitimate 
reasons. 
SECTION 4 -RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF THE PARTIES 
Each of the parties hereto acknowledges the 4.1 
fights and responsibilities of the other party and 
pgrees to discharge its responsibilities under this 
Agreement, 
The Union {its officers and representatives, at *2 
ail levels) and all employees &e bound to 'observe 
rfac provisions of thls^Agreeraent 
The Company (its officers'afld representatives, 4.3 
Lt all levels) is bound to observfe the provisions of 
fois Agreement. 
In addition to the responsibilities that may be <u 
provided elsewhere in this Agreement, the follow. 
ing shall be observed: 
1. There shall be no intimidation or coercion of *£ 
employees .into joining the Union or continu-
ing thfir 'membership therein. 
2. There shall be no Union activity on Company 4.6 
turn 
3. There shall be no strikes, work stoppages, or 4 J 
interruption or impeding of work. No officer 
or representative of the Umoa shaErauthorize, 
instigate, aid, or condone any such activities. 
Mo employee shall participate in any such 
activities. 
4. The applicable procedures of the Agreement 4.8 
will be followed for the settlement of all com-
plaints or grievances. 
5. Thfcre shall be no interference wi%the right of 4.9 
employees to become or continue as Members 
of the,Union. 
6. There shall be no discrimination, restramt, or 4.10 
coercion against any employee because of 
membership in the Union. 
25 
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Ronald Chilton 
214 East 1350 North 
Zl i ^ Lehi, Utah 84043 
November 20, 2003 
Honorable Judge Pat Brian 
3rd District Court 
West Valley, Utah 
Civil #030105887 
Dear Judge Pat Brian, 
This letter is in reference to a my letter, on November 13t 2003 filed with the court (Enclosed is a copy 
of said letter). The reasons for my letters to the court is to establish an " alternative starting date " of 
when we the plaintiffs became aware of the alleged fraud We discovered the vacation pay issue in the 
(Chamberlain /Young)Case # 9700400240 in the Orem, Utah 4th district court, April-May 2001. 
Also enclosed is a copy of the first court filing, case # 010403553 4th District Court, Provo, Utah/Filed 
on July 30, 2001. (This was only two months after we became aware of VacationTqy fraud.) 
This case was later sent to 3rd district Court, in Salt Lake City. And assigned to 
Judge Tyron Medley, andassigneda new case # 020906405. Enclosed is a copy of Judge Medleys' 
Ruling to dismiss this case WITH OUT PRED1JUCE because of our attorney, James C. Haskins was 
negligent in serving Allen Young in a timely manner. 
On the 26 of Sept. in your court, you asked both parties if they had everything in their briefs concerning 
our case, however, 1 feel you need this new information, (facts) as our attorney has not represented the 
plaintiffs fairly in this "(alternative starting date)" (April/.May 2001).' Aslsiated.before, my attorney 
will not return any calls, or accept mail, enclosed is a copy of my letter thql wasjmarked u unclaimed* io 
rJames-C. Haskins. -• - -. - ^< - . I I'l. — — l\Tl'l 1-_ " 1 
Please let us-have our day in Court. 
Sincerely, 
Ronald Chilton (/ 
r~h~u/'t yets* 
STk1656 
vviurt (if Pr,2-3k 
• • -if'AHIMEfcl 
Honorable Judge Pat Brian 
3rd District Court 
West Valley Utah 
Civil U 030105887 
Dear Judge Pat Brian 
J am a client of James G Haskins In the Third District Court action (Ronald Chilton /Allen Young). 
I came to the courthouse, 3rd. District in West Valley and pulled up our case documents, to make sure 
The facts as discussed with Mr Haskins and assured by Mr Thomas Thompson were in the brief 
submitted to the court While he has argued several issues of our case, J find that he has not responded to 
several key issues, whether by negligence or intentional oversight I am not sure. But after three + years 
trying to get this to court it makes a person wonder 1 have tried to talk to my attorney by phone, but he 
will not return my calls, I have sent him registered mail and it is returned to me marked (/REJECTED) 
By Mr Haskins. My only other option is to try to address the court, I can only hope you have the time to 
read my facts. 
In the Baldwin case cited by both attorneys Mr Young states that the court cited (DUE DILEGENCE) 
As a factor where the aggrieved parties could have found the alleged fraud with due diligence 
(such as going thru a Title Company.) We the plaintive in the (Pickering/ U.SJC) case, felt like we 
hired a title company namely, our attorney Mr. Young, to advise the clients as to the meaning of 
Judge Jenkins ruling. If a title company gives a client the wrong information they are at fault, and must 
pay any damages the* clienVrncurred. The same applies w our attorney who misrepresented to the clients 
"Judge Jenkins l-uRng' "Th the "coufi"cterksfindings te "slafes that neither partyoffers~(T starting 'date'urto' 
the time when we discovered the alleged fraud I discussed this at length with Mr. Haskins and he still 
neglected to put it in court. 
We discovered the fraud at the (Chamberlain / Young) trial (date April and May of2O01). When 
Judge Scott Daniels sat on the witness chair and stated in his opinion after redding Judge Jenkins ruling 
That Mr. Young owed Vacation Pay to all Plaintiffs in the Pickering I U.SJC. case. This was the time I 
found out he owed vacation pay. I contacted Mr.. Haskins concerning the possibility of a law suit to 
recover lost monies. Tlie STARTING DATE for the clock to start on the statue of limitation was 
May 200L In my opinion we the plaintiffs in the Pickering / Young trial were diligent in hiring our 
attorneys, Mr. Young and his associates to evaluate Judge Jenkins ruling and had every right to rely on 
their opinion. In fact not a right but an obligation to trust them. (BALDWIN/ BURTON) 850 p2d 1188 
(1993) saying that the start time is measured from the time the fraud is DISCOVERED. I can only hope 
we get our day in court in front of a jury of our peers, Win, Lose, or Draw that is all we can ask. 
Thank you, 
Ronald Chilton 
Copys sent to : James Haskins /y 
Utah State Bar ^ 
Ronald Chilton 
214 East J350 North 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
November 13, 2003 
Exhibit H 
with BM&T. Pickering decision at 5,40. Judge Jenkins found that none of the plaintiff 
steeiworkers were employed by USX as of January 1,1988. Section 502(a)(3) remedies were to 
be measured in context of the 1987 BLA and Pension Agreements as if steelworker plaintiffs 
were terminated when Geneva was sold to BM&T on August 31,1987. 
After Judge Jenkins' decision, a settlement for $47 million was reached and a meeting 
was held with the steeiworkers regarding the settlement. The settlement was approved by all the 
steeiworkers and the money was paid out to each steelworker in two payments. The final 
payment was made in March 1996. The Plaintiffs' claims all relate to the settlement agreement 
and the Defendants' handling thereof. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2002, Plaintiffs filed the present law suit, which some Plaintiffs by and through 
different counsel later amended by the third amended complaint. One group of Plaintiffs are 
represented by Haskins & Associates. These Plaintiffs have dismissed their claims. The other 
group of Plaintiffs are represented by Hill, Johnson & Schmutz ("HJS Plaintiffs11). The HJS 
Plaintiffs filed the third amended complaint which is the operating complaint for the present 
second motion for summary judgment. The HJS Plaintifs allege six causes of action, 
specifically, (1) fraudulent misrepresentation, (2) legal malpractice-breach of contract, (3) legal 
malpractice—breach of fiduciary duty, (4) legal malpractice—negligence, (5) accounting, and (6) 
breach of trust/breach of fiduciary duty cause of action. 
On April 6,2005, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendants also 
4 
249-250 (1986), In other words, unsupported opinions and conclusions will not defeat summary 
judgment Robertson v. Utah Fuel Company, 889 P.2d 1382,1388 n. 4 (Utah App. 1995); 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). A party is required to come forward with 
admissible evidence to support their claims. Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021,1022 (Utah 1968). 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The First Cause of Action alleged by the Plaintiffs in the Third Amended Complaint is 
"Fraudulent Misrepresentation." The Plaintiffs claim the Defendants misrepresented that the 
"Plaintiffs would receive in the proposed settlement everything Judge Jenkins awarded to the 
'bellwether' plaintiffs in the USX case, and more" because the settlement did not include any 
amount for vacation pay to be paid in 1988 and "other elements and components of the 
compensation awarded by Judge Jenkins to the 'bellwether' USX plaintiffs." (Third Am. Compl. 
TI38 and 39). 
Defendants move for summary judgment on this issue for two reasons. First; the claim 
was not pled with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
particularly in light of the fact that this Court already ruled that Judge Jenkins did not award 
vacation pay for 1988 and the claims based upon this alleged misrepresentation have been 
dismissed. Second, there is no evidence, and Plaintiffs have provided none, to support the 
statement that "other elements and components" awarded by Judge Jenkins were not included. 
At trial, Plaintiffs would be required to prove each element of their fraud claim by clear and 
convincing evidence and must, therefore, meet that same standard in opposing summary 
judgment by coming forward with evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the 
13 
Exhibit I 
dismissed with prejudice on May 31,1994, and January 3,1995, respectively^ Pickering 
decision at 3. Judge Jenkins concluded that rader §502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 USCA 
§H32(a)(3)(1985), equitable relief would include "an award of back pay (wages, sick leave, 
vacation pay, incentive pay or other employee compeasaticn} equal to the compensation [him or 
her] would have received durfeg the periods of recall to employment at Geneva,,.. less any 
amount of income earned by [him or her] through other employment during tuose same periods/1 
See e.g, Pickering decision at 56, 
Section 502(a)(3) remedies were to be measured in context of the 1987 BLA and Pension 
Agreement as if the steelworlcer plsiutifik were terminated when Geneva was sold to BM&T on 
August 31,1987. Under the 1987 BLA* an employee wa? entitled to a foil years vacation pay to 
be paid the next calendar year if the employee was employed for six consecutive months in any 
year. If an employee "quits, retires, dbs or is discharged prior to January 1 of ths vacation year" 
then the employee forfeits the right to receive vacation benefits. BLA at § 12-A-3, The BLA 
was amended by Appendix R to permit eligibility if one of three conditions was satisfied, either 
"(1) The employee is recalled to work in 19877 (2) The empioye^worked between Jims 15, 
1986, and July 3i, 1986, or (3) The employee satisfied the eligibility provisions of Section 12-A-
1-b of the Collective Bargaining Agreement," Appendix R is silent on the issue- cf forfeit 
Judge Jenkins found that USX sold die Geneva steel plant to Basic Manufacture snd 
Technology (BM&T) effective August 31,1987. The. steelworfcer union, United Steelworkers of 
America (the Union) ratified the June 8 agreement and June 12 collective bargaining agreement 
with BM&T Piclcering decision at 5,40. None of die plaintiff steelworkers were emnloyed bv 
USX as of January L 1988. 
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opposition were without merit, The Defendants expanded significantly on these arguments at the 
hearing. 
The Plaintiffs had no opportunity to reply under the procedural rules to ihc Defendants 
supplemental affidavits and additional twelve exhibits, The Defendants, as the moving party, 
determined the scope of their motion for summary judgment Only two issues were raised by the 
Defendants motion. To permit the Defendants to expand the scope of their motion for summary 
judgment in their reply would be against fee "letter and spirit" of the summary judgment rule and 
permitting summary judgment to be "a vehicle of iryustice." Accordingly, the Court concludes 
that the scope of the Defendants motion for summary judgment is limited to two issues, 
specifically, (1) whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to received vacation pay and (2) whether the 
Plaintiffs were entitled to attorney's fees. However, should summary judgment be revisited with 
a proper pleading providing the undisputed facts and applicable law for each cause of action, the 
Court may grant summary judgment on some of the causes of action that were argued at the 
hearing. 
A 
VACATION PAY 
Defendants argue the Plaintiffs were not entitled to receive vacation pay accrued in 1987, 
to be paid out in 1988, because section 12-A-3 of the BLA provides that such vacation pay is 
forfeited if the employees are no longer employed there on January 1,1998- In Pickering the 
court found that all of the steelworkers were terminated on August 31,1987, when USX sold the 
Geneva steel plant to BM&T. Since no employee worked at USX on January 1,1998, no 
employee qualified for the vacation pay accrued in 1987, to be payable in 1998. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 9 
In opposition, the Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to vacation pay that accrued in 
1987, because Appendix R to the BLA amended the eligibility requirements for 1987 vacation 
pay and therefore, the forfeit provision did not apply. Under Appendix R the Plaintiffs only had 
to satisfy one of the criteria to qualify for deferred vacation pay in the next year. Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs became eligible for deferred vacation pay in 1988, that had been vested or accrued in 
1987. Specifically, the Plaintiffs argue that Appendix Q, n, reflects that in light of the 
"continuing concern" shared by "the Union and the Company," that USX assured the Plaintiffs 
that the criteria introduced via Appendix R would remain and did remain in place with respect to 
vacation years 1987-1988. 
In reply, the Defendants-argue that Appendix R only related to 1987 vacation eligibility 
and has no bearing on 1988 vacation pay. Defendants argue that Appendix Q, II had "absolutely 
nothing to do with vacation pay, but only constituted a joint commitment by USX and the Union 
to participate in the work of the Geneva Advisory Board to study and review the feasibility 
regarding "market conditions for Geneva as a. steel-making facility/' Defendants argue that there 
is nothing in the six steelworkers' affidavits providing that they were ever assured that Appendix 
R concerning 1987 vacation pay would remain in effect for 1988 vacation pay. 
Under the 1987 BLA, an employee was entitled to a full years vacation pay to be paid the 
next calendar year if the employee was employed for six consecutive months in any year. If an 
employee "quits, retires, dies or is discharged prior to January 1 of the vacation year" then the 
employee forfeits the right to receive vacation benefits. BLA at § 12-A-3. The BLA was 
amended by Appendix R to permit eligibility if one of three conditions was satisfied, either "(1) 
The employee is recalled to work in 1987, (2) The employee worked between June 15,1986 and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 10 
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July 31,1986, or (3) The employee satisfied the eligibility provisions of Section 12-A-l-b of the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement." Appendix R is silent on the issue of forfeit. 
Reviewing § 12-A-l-b of the BLA, to be eligible for vacation pay in 1987, an employee 
must be employed for six months. However, such right k forfeited if the employee "quits, 
retires, dies or is discharged prior to January 1 of the vacation year" then the employee forfeits 
the right to receive vacation benefits. BLAat§i2-A-3. Appendix R amends the eligibility 
requirements to include two additional ways to be eligible for vacation pay, but is silent on the 
forfeit issue. Although the Plaintifis desire that the Court view Appendix R as striking the 
forfeit exception, the Court cannot do so. Appendix R addresses eligibility and therefore, 
amends 12-A-l-b to include two additional ways to be eligible. However, this increase in 
eligibility does not strike or amend the forfeit language. Appendix Q also does not strike or 
amend the forfeit language. Without express language striking or amending the forfeit language, 
the Court must read the BL A as a whole, which includes the forfeit language of § 12-A-3, The 
Court concludes that any vacation that might have accrued in 1987, to those eligible was not 
payable in 1988 because such vacation pay was forfeited when they were all effectively 
discharged on August 31,1987, which was prior to January 1,1988. As found in Pickering, 
none of the plaintiff steel workers were employed by USX as of January 1,1988. Therefore, this 
Court concludes that none of them were entitled to vacation pay accrued in 1987, that was 
payable in 1988. Accordingly, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the Defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment on the limited issue of whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to 
vacation pay accrued in 1987, to be paid out in 1988. 
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November 1,06 
The defendants in this case are the attorneys who represented about 1800 
former steel workers at U.S.X. Corp. Geneva works Steel Plant in a lawsuit 
lasting over 8 years and two trials before Honorable Judge Bruce Jenkins, 
after the first trial, Judge Bruce Jenkins ruled in 1992 that USX had violated 
ERISA by failing to recall categories of plaintiff steel workers during the 
period following the end of the work stoppage on Jan. 31,1987, until USX 
sold Geneva to Basic Manufacturing & technology on Aug. 31, 1987. After 
the second trial, Judge Jenkins issued his decision in 1995 (the Jenkins 
Decision) ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover certain benefits 
from USX as though they had worked from 2/1/87 thru 8/31/87. Judge 
Jenkins ruled that 22 of the 24 bell weather plaintiffs whose case's were 
typical of the other approxenly 1700 steel Workers were entitled to an award 
of back pay) WHICH INCLUDES WAGES, SICK LEAVE, VACATION 
PAY, INCENTIVE PAY OR OTHER EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION. 
Equal to the amount they would have received at USX during the period 
between 1/31/87 and 8/31/87 . No. one is arguing Judge Jenkins ruling, it 
stands by it's self, as it is, for what it is . What is being argued is the 
interpretation of the ruling. Everyone agrees on what he ruled, WHICH 
INCLUDES WAGES, SICK LEAVE, VACATION PAY, INCENTIVE PAY, 
OR OTHER EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, AND BENEFITS, AS 
THOUGH YOU HAD WORKED. 
Allen Young knew on 6/19/95 Nine days before the settlement meeting the 
USX WORKER WERE AWARDED ACCRUING PENSION THRU 
8/31/87 and ACCRUING BENEFITS thru 2/1/93 (See EXHIBIT -1-) 
Everyone knows the BASIC LABOR AGREEMENT is a contract between 
USX and UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA No one including 
Honorable Pat Brian has the right to change the Honorable Federal Judge 
Bruce Jenkins ruling and words. All parties have to live with in the FOUR 
CORNERS OF THIS CONTRACT. The Basic Labor Agreement is very 
specific, giving the Company, USX the right to manage its business as it 
sees fit, as long as it does not violate the Basic Labor Agreement 
(EXHIBIT 2 PAGE 24, Section 3, 3-2) which reads, The rights to 
manage the business and Plants and to direct the working forces include 
the right to hire, suspend and DISCHARGE FOR PROPER CAUSE 
or transfer and the right to relieve employees from duty because of lack 
of work or for other legitimate reasons. 
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Again the defendants either willfully or mistakenly misquote the BLA 
SECTION 12 (a-3). This SECTION is very clear and plain, it states it's a 
A forfeit clause that pertains to an employee who (QUITS, RETIRES, 
DIES, OR IS DISCHARGED). NOT FOR ANY OTHER REASON. If 
for an example as the defendant state, IF AN EMPLOYEE WAS NOT 
WORKING JANUARY 1, OF THE VACATION YEAR, WHAT HAPPENS 
TO ALL THE EMPLOYEES WHOSE SCHEDULE HAS THEM OFF ON 
JANUARY 1 ? (Do those employees forfeit there accrued vacation, OF 
COURSE NOT. THEY NEVER HAVE BEFORE WHY NOW. THE 
JUDGE ORDERED IT AS WE HAD WORKED. This is why you Mr. 
Burbidge and the Defendants can not use a line or a word or a sentence out, 
of context. You must-read the WHOLE SECTION with the rest of the 
BLA. To get the true meaning of the BLA. Again on page five on your 
motion dated 10/24/06 Mr. Burbidge crosses the line by saying Judge 
Jenkins said all STEEL WORKERS were lawfully terminated (with which 
we agree,) and then in the same breath says all STEAL WORKERS were 
discharged. (WITH WHICH WE DON'T AGREE.) Mr. Burbidge knows the 
BLA is very specific about the steps required for discharge. ( NOBODY 
WAS DISCHARGED NOR AFFECTIVELY DISCHARGED). The problem 
is the Defendants know the forfeiture language is for quit, die, retire or 
discharged for proper cause. The defendants keep trying to throw 
discharged in the courts face, this in essence was the mistake Honorable Pat 
Brian made when he listened to the defendants SAY, " All the Steelworkers 
were discharged, and his ruling states "AFFECTIVELY DISCHARGED." 
HONORABLE JUDGE PAT BRIAN HAD NO RIGHT TO CHANGE 
TERMINATED TO EFFETELY DISCHARGED, by doing so he made 
an erroneous mistake, granting the defendants first motion for summary 
judgment. By doing so he also erred in granting their second motion for 
summary judgment. By granting the first motion for summary judgment he 
removed all issue pertaining to the 2nd motion for summary Judgment. As I 
have told the court before, and I will say it again, (I do not blame 
Honorable Judge Brian for making this mistake, I blame both the defendants 
attorney and the plaintiffs attorney for not making the issue of terminating, 
and discharged as used in the BLA clear to the Honorable Judge Brian. As 
to Mr. Burbidge saying Ronald Chilton is now PRO-SE ten months after 
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Judge Pat Brian memorandum decision is WRONG Chilton went Pro-se in 
the early part of 2004. At this time because of the letters sent to the court by 
Chilton, the plaintiffs won, when Honorable Pat Brian refused to grant the 
first motion of summary judgment to the defendants on 12/24/03. 
I Hired Mr. Evan Schmutz the early part of 2004 after being coaxed by 
other clients and Mr. Schmutz. Evan neglected to do as he promised his 
clients he would do. The clients done all we could do to get him to keep his 
promise, when he refused, I Ronald went around Mr. Schmutz and sent a 
letter for help to the court Neither Haskins who was my first attorney, nor 
Evan who was my 2nd attorney done what they promised. Therefore when 
Evan withdrew as my council Chilton filed to go pro-se and David Glazier 
soon followed. We filed our Reconsideration Motion immediately within 
10 days. As for voluminous briefing and lengthily oral arguments, " That is 
a Joke." Mr. Burbidge used most of the court time in both of the Motion 
Summary Judgment. while Mr Schmutz done nothing. NOW, finally after 
Chilton & Glaizer went Pro-Se , Evan has filed his motion for 
reconsideration and an objection to defendants Motion to Strike Chilton & 
Glazier Motion for Reconsideration. As for Chilton and Glazier being 
grossly tardy, this is more of Mr. Burbidge hog-wash and gibberish. 
Mr. Burbidge knows when the defendants filed their first MS J they were 
Adamantly persuasive that all USX employees were discharged. Now the 
plaintiffs have proven they were not discharged, but terminated due to the 
plant closing, Mr. Burbidge has changed his position to terminated. But still 
tries to use the forfeit language of discharge on termination. No where is 
there any language in the BLA which says forfeiture of benefits if 
terminated. The defendants continually say " If you were not working on 
January first you are not entitled to vacation pay that year. (What about the 
100s of employees whose working schedule had the employee off on Jan. 
first Did they forfeit their vacationpay. NO-NO-NO. THIS HAS BEEN 
A PRACTICE FOR 40 + YEARS TO HAVE PEOPLE OFF DUE TO 
WORK SCHEDULE ON January the first of every year. 
In defendants Exhibit C on page 11 the attorney Mr. Burbidge again 
misquotes the BLA on page 90 section 12 (a-3) Mr. Burbidge says, while 
the BLA provides that working a certain amount of time in 1987 Entitles a 
steel worker to vacation pay in 1988. Burbidge says: "This is only true if 
you worked Jan. the first 1988", Nowhere in the BLA does it say this.. .It is 
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a figment of Mr. Burbidge's imagination. Mr. Burbidge misquotes the 
BLA... Section 12 (a-3) of the BLA is very clear and plain. Mr. Burbidge ~ 
read what is written, not what you would like it to say.. .It says an employee 
even though otherwise elegible under this sub section A-3 FORFEITS THE 
RIGHT TO RECEIVE VACATION BENEFITS UNDER TfflS SECTION 
IF HE QUITS, DDES, RETIRES OR IS DISCHARGE FOR PROPER 
CAUSE; prior to Jan. 1 of the vacation year. Since no one quit, died, or 
was discharged, THIS FORFEIT LANGUAGE DOES NOT APPLY. 
When the BLA is read in the right light, as it was intended, It completely 
invalidates all of Mr. Burbidge's deduction, and arguments on this issue. 
Another Misquote of Mr. Burbidge, on page 12 line 5 of his ruling, you 
misquote Honorable Judge Jenkins saying, he only awarded benefits 
received in 1987. This is total complete balderdash. This is not what he 
said. He awarded BENEFITS EARNED AND ACCURDED IN 1987, "AS 
IF YOU HAD WORKED" (In at least 22 places in Judge Jenkins 
ruling.) Some of these accrued benefits continue for up to TWO YEARS & 
MORE after the date of sale. 8/31/87. Mr. Young knew that some of these 
accrued benefits continued until 1993. (See exhibit one.) As far as 
section B of Burbidge's motion, (the attorney fee claim). Not one of the 
plaintiffs looked into any crystal ball, and said, (Judge Jenkins would award 
attorney fees.)(Pickering / USX). It was the defendant attorneys who told 
USX the judge would probley award attorney fees if the case went to 
adjudication. What the plaintiffs complained of was the fraudulent misuse 
of these funds. No attorney has the right to syphon off the top of any award 
in an out of court settlement, of any fees until that money is distributed to all 
clients. Then the attorney gets his continuency fee at that time.. .NOT 
BEFORE. 
NO one except Mr. Burbidge and his clients fanticises in Never Never 
Land, they misconstrue what is said, they misquote the BLA. He has 
attacked my handicaps and attacked my integrity, saying," Chilton has 
been in court over 35 times and went pro-se in some of those cases. SO 
WHAT. How many times has Burbidgebeen to court? It does not matter. 
What matters is the fact he has to stoop to this kind of garbage to try to win 
his case. SORRY Burbidge I will not stoop to your level. All we have ever 
ask in the last 
Five and one half years is our day in court. It is not the pro-se plaintiffs 
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who is dragging this out. It is the lawyers. I do understand why you are 
afraid of the motion to reconsider. If you are sure of the position you are 
defending, you have nothing to worry about. I am sure of my position. And 
I know the Honorable Judge Roth will make the correct decision now he has 
a copy of Judge Scott Daniels deposition-Allen Young deposition- Mountain 
View Transcript -Judge Jenkins ruling- the BLA. And assorted documents. 
The defendants position, is that no benefits were paid after 8/31/87 is not 
right 
As to page 13 again Mr. Burbidge you are putting words in Honorable 
Judge Jenkins mouth. True, he did say we were terminated as of 8/31/87. 
He never said, We were not entitled to VACATION PAY under 
Section 12A-3, because we were terminated. As Mr. Burbidge says, the 
language of the BLASection A-3 relates to discharge prier to Jan 1,1988. 
The problem with Mr. Burbidge scenario is, he keeps getting terminated and 
discharged mixed up, using the two words as though they are the same. 
NOT SO. Termination is an act by the company in its normal course of 
business. The employee has no input to this action according to the BLA. 
Vacation is an accrued benefit the same as pension, sub pay, profit sharing, 
incentive pay. These and other benefits are accrued over a period of time, 
and are payable when due. In the case of pension they are accrued over a 
period of many years, and are payable when a person reached retirement. 
They are not lost when the company terminates an employee. The same 
holds true for sub pay benefits, they are accrued over a period of time, and 
are not lost upon termination. They go on for years after termination. 
Vacation pay is accrued over a period of time, and are only paid when they 
become due. In other words the following year. These are all accrued 
benefits and are not LOST upon termination. If you use Mr. Burbidge 
reasoning, that because you were TERMINATED you were. 
EFFECTIVELY DISCHARGED, so you FORFEIT your BENEFITS... 
THIS IS TOTALLY UNTRUE! ! ! 
Come on Mr. Burbidge, your arguments on forfeiture do not make any 
sense. Forfeiture was written for the express purpose of quit, die, retire, or 
discharge, not for any other reason. 
When Mr. Young and his Associate's stood on the floor at the 
settlement meeting and held Honorable Judge Jenkins Ruling in their hands, 
saying, "In our heart of hearts we believe this settlement which we have 
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reached with USX gives all of you 100% + More of honorable Judge 
Jenkins Ruling, they the defendants took all of USX obligations on their 
selves. They negotiated this settlement with USX and sold it to their clients 
thru a lie, by saying 100% + MORE. Here is the promise 100 % + MORE 
where is our money? That's what we want to Know! As you say Mr. 
Burbidge the Plaintiffs attorney was lacking in his arguments of the BLA. 
That is why we are asking the court for a reconsideration. 
DATED this__l__day of November, 2006 
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KESTER & PETRO; GERRY L. 
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DEFENDANTS5 JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STRIKE MOTION OF "CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS55 FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF THE COURT'S FIRST ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT (VACATION 
PAY ISSUE) AND OPPOSITION TO A PORTION OF DEFENDANTS5 JOINT 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
RONALD J. CHILTON AND DAVID L. GLAZIER 
Defendants Allen K. Young, Young, Kester & Petro, Jonah Orlofsky, Plotkin, 
Jacobs & Orlofsky, Ltd., Gerry L. Spence, Lynn C, Harris, and Spence, Moriarity & 
Schuster (hereinafter jointly referred to as "Counsel") jointly file this memorandum in 
support of their motion to strike the motion of the Plaintiffs represented by Hill, Johnson 
& Schnmtz (the "HJS Plaintiffs'5) to reconsider the Honorable Pat B. Brian's decision 
rendered September 22,2005 granting Counsel's first motion for summary judgment on 
Plaintiffs5 vacation pay claim, and to strike the HJS Plaintiffs5 opposition to Counsel's 
joint motion to strike the motions for reconsideration filed by Ronald J. Chilton 
("Chilton") and David L. Glazier ("Glazier"). 
INTRODUCTION 
The Defendants in this case (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Counsel") are 
the attorneys who represented over 1,800 former steelworkers at USX Corporation's 
Geneva Works steel plant in a titanic battle with USX lasting over eight years and through 
two lengthy trials before the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, in both of which Counsel were 
successful for their clients. After the first trial, Judge Jenkins ruled in 1992 that USX had 
2 
violated ERISA by failing to recall categories of Plaintiff steelworkers during the period ' 
following the end of a work stoppage on January 31,1987, until USX sold Geneva to 2-> 
Basic Minerals and Technologies, Inc. ("BM&T") on August 31,1987. After the second p 
trial, Judge Jenkins issued his decision in 1995 (the "Jenkins Decision") ruling that all but CI 
two of the 24 '"bellwether" Plaintiffs whose claims were considered to be typical of the "\ 
different categories of the remaining Plaintiffs were entitled to recover back pay from £ 
USXjiuring varying periods between FebraaoLLifaraugh August 3XJU£&£that Judge 1 
Jenkins ruled the bellwether individual Plaintiffs should have been recalled, less income^ 
earned by the bellwether Plaintiffs from other sources during the damage periods. The c\ 
amount of damages the bellwether Plaintiffs were entitled to recover and the damage (# 
claims of the remaining many hundreds of steelworkers remained to be tried.1 i•' 
As a result of this remarkable effort, Counsel were finally able to obtain a / U 
settlement which obviated the need for hundreds of trials over a period of several years. > } 
Under the Settlement Agreement, USX Corporation agreed to and did in fact pay $47 / V 
Million in cash in two installments in September 1995 and March 1996 and agreed to / * 
various pension benefits for the steelworkers. The settlement with USX gave the / ^ 
steelworkers everything that Judge Jenkins' Decision would have given them after many / 7 
more years of litigation plus $3,714 Million above actual damages based upon Counsel's ! $ 
1
 For example, it remained for each individual steelworker not only to prove the amount 
of his or her damages, but (except for the bellwether Plaintiffs) to prove when he or she would 
have been recalled to work by USX following the end of the work stoppage on January 31,1987 
if USX had not been motivated by a desire to interfere with the steelworkers' pension benefits. 
3 
argument to USX that Judge Jenkins would probably ultimately award the steelworkers | 
attorneys* fees, although in ERISA actions the court has discretion whether to award fj 
attorneys5 fees to either party and attorneys' fees are not to be awarded as a matter of r 
course. I 
After full disclosure of the terms of the settlement in written documents and during 
a lengthy meeting held with the steelworkers at Mountain View High School on June 28,£ 
1995, the 1,677 settling steelworkers unanimously approved the settlement in writing and 
later each, in writing, released Counsel from any liability in connection with the £E 
settlement. The steelworkers were paid every dime of their settlement.2 n 
Despite the truly landmark victory won by Counsel for their clients, a small 
minority of the steelworkers filed this lawsuit in July 2001 - - a full six years after the 
settlement - - making meritless claims against attorney Allen Young concerning the 
settlement that all steelworkers unanimously accepted so many years ago. Three years 
later, in 2004, the majority of the Plaintiffs obtained new counsel, Hill, Johnson & 
Schmutz ("HJS")> and filed a Third Amended Complaint adding the remaining Counsel as 
Defendants nine years after the settlement. 
The genesis of the lawsuit, and the principal claim originally asserted by Plaintiffs 
against Counsel, was that they misrepresented that the USX settlement would give the 
2
 Of the original approximately 1,892 Plaintiff steelworkers, the claims of approximately 
200 retired steelworkers had been dismissed by Judge Jenkins5 first decision in 1992 because 
they had retired prior to the work stoppage. USX paid $5,000 to each retiree in 1993 to settle 
their claims. 
4 
Plaintiffs everything that the Jenkins Decision would give them and more, but that * 
representation was allegedly false because Judge Jenkins allegedly awarded Plaintiffs Q^ 
1988 vacation pay but the settlement did not. On September 22,2005, Judge Pat B. Brian 3 
issued his Memorandum Decision (the "First Brian Decision"), a copy of which is ¥ 
attached hereto as Exhibit A, granting Counsel summary judgment dismissing that claim. < 
Judge Brian ruled that because Judge Jenkins had ruled in the USX case that all of the M 
steel workers were lawfully terminated as USX employees when USX sold the Geneva 7 
plant effective August 31,1987, no steelworkers were entitled to vacation pay in 1988 J7 
because under the Basic Labor Agreement between USX and United Steelworkers of ^t 
America (the "Union") a steelworker was not entitled to vacation pay in 1988 if he or she / 
was discharged prior to January 1,1988. / ' 
Counsel thereafter filed a second joint motion for summary judgment on the / X. 
Plaintiffs' remaining alleged claims for fraud, legal malpractice-breach of contract, legal / 
malpractice-breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice-negligence and accounting. In / < 
response to the motion, the 38 Plaintiffs represented by Haskins & Associates, having had / 
their claims for 1988 vacation pay which generated the lawsuit dismissed by Judge Brian,
 } 
voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. The remaining approximately 180 / y 
Plaintiffs represented by HJS attempted to stay in court by asserting a hodgepodge of / £> 
supposed wrongdoing by Counsel which they argued entitled them to relief The / 9 
remaining Plaintiffs resorted to asserting new claims in opposition to the second summary 
judgment motion that were not even alleged in their Third Amended Complaint. ^3L 
5 
ARGUMENT 
THE HJS PLAINTIFFS HAVE WHOLLY FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
ANY BASIS FOR RECONSIDERING JUDGE BRIAN'S DECISION. 
The claim which gave birth to this lawsuit was the-Plaintiffs' erroneous notion that 
under Judge Jenkins' decision in the USX case all of the steeiworkers were entitled to 
vacation pay in 1988 and that because the USX settlement did not include any amount for 
1988 vacation pay. Counsel's representation to the steeiworkers that the settlement gave 
them everything that Judge Jenkins5 decision would have given them after many more 
years of litigation was false. The Plaintiffs asserted claims for fraud, legal malpractice-
breach of contract, legal malpractice-negligence and legal malpractice-breach of fiduciary 
duty based upon Counsel's alleged failure to obtain 1988 vacation pay as part of the 
settlement After lengthy briefing and argument, Judge Brian granted summary judgment 
dismissing Plaintiffs' 1988 vacation pay claims on September 22,2005- Judge Brian 
coixectly ruled that the steeiworkers were only entitled to 1988 vacation pay if they were 
still employed by USX as of January 1,1988. Because Judge Jenkins had ruled that all of 
the steeiworkers were terminated when USX sold the Geneva steel plant to Basic 
Minerals and Technologies, Inc. effective August 31,1987, the steeiworkers were not 
entitled to 1988 vacation pay. 
8 
When the HJS Plaintiffs opposed the second summary judgment motion months 
after the first summary judgment motion was decided, they did not seek to have Judge 
Brian reconsider his decision on the vacation pay claim. Now, one year after Judge 
Brian's decision, the HJS Plaintiffs have jumped on the bandwagon of pro se Plaintiffs 
Chilton and Glazier to belatedly argue that Judge Brian incorrectly ruled that the Plaintiffs 
were not entitled to 1988 vacation pay under Judge Jenkins5 decision because they were 
discharged as employees when USX Corporation ("USX") sold the Geneva steel plant 
effective August 31,1987 .a^d,lhus, were-no longer employed onJanuary 1,1988, which 
was a requirement to receives1988 vacation pay ./Unlike Chilton and Glazier, me HJS 
Plaintiffs make no attempt to have the court reconsider Judge Brian's decision on 
Counsel's second motion for summary judgment.4 
The HJS Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on the vacation pay claim is made 
on the very same basis as the Chilton and Glazier motions for reconsideration on that 
claim: That Judge Jenkins determined that all of the steelworkers' employment had been 
terminated as of August 31,1987 at the time of the Geneva sale, but that under the Basis 
Labor Agreement ("BLA") between the Union and USX a "discharge" is supposedly 
4
 Perhaps this is because, as the court will see when it hears and determines Counsel's third motion 
for summary judgment on the remaining breach of fiduciary duty claim, the HJS Plaintiffs attempt to 
essentially ignore Judge Brian's second decision by improperly reasserting (under a breach of fiduciary duty 
rubric) the very same factual claims that Judge Brian has already dismissed. 
9 
different than a "termination." Although the HJS Plaintiffs concede the interpretation of 
the BLA was a question of law for Judge Brian to decide [HJS Pis' Memo, at 2-3], they 
erroneously argue Judge Brians interpretation of the BLA was wrong* 
The one notable difference between the motions for reconsideration filed by 
Chilton and Glazier on the vacation pay claim and the motion for reconsideration filed by 
the HJS Plaintiffs on the vacation pay claim is that the HJS Plaintiffs do not argue that 
any newly discovered evidence justifies reconsideration.5 Rather, the HJS Plaintiffs 
attempt to justify their extravagantly tardy motion for reconsideration by castigating 
Judge Brian over and over again in their memorandum for supposedly not interpreting the 
provisions of the Basic Labor Agreement (the "BLA") as a whole and ignoring the 
provisions of the BLA concerning "discharge."6 
The short and dispositive answer to this baseless and remarkably unfair criticism 
of Judge Brian is that the HJS Plaintiffs' legal argument concerning the purported 
meaning of "discharge" under the BLA is an entirely new argument that was not made in 
any fashion by the HJS Plaintiffs before Judge Brian. Indeed, glaringly absent from the 
5
 Chilton and Glazier erroneously argued that a pay stub which supposedly showed that a single 
steelworker received 1988 vacation pay constituted new evidence. As pointed out by Counsel in their 
motion to strike, that pay stub shows no such thing and it was not newly discovered. 
6
 Courts recognize that a "discharge*' of an employee means "termination" of the 
employee. See, e.g., Fishgoldv. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Corp., 66 S. Ct. 1105,1112 (1946) 
("discharge normally means termination of the employment relationship or loss of a position/5); 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Brown, 540 P.2d 651,654 (Ariz. 1975); Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 
249 A.2d 866, 869 (Del. 1969) ('"discharge5 normally means the termination of the employment 
relationship , . . . " ) • 
10 
new argument that the HJS Plaintiffs have belatedly raised is not based upon any relevant 
new evidence, but could have been asserted had the HJS Plaintiffs' counsel chosen to do 
so in opposition to the first summary judgment motion 16 months ago. They should not 
now be permitted to try on for size a new argument that could have been made at the time 
the first summary judgment motion was considered by Judge Brian. 
The HJS Plaintiffs attempt to justify raising their new argument for the first time 
16 months after their original opposition by telling the court that they could not have 
anticipated that Judge Brian would rule against them on the 1988 vacation pay claim on 
the basis that they had been discharged from their employment prior to January 1,1988 
and, therefore, were not entitled to 1988 vacation pay under Judge Jenkins' decision. The 
HJS Plaintiffs are not being candid with the court. Their argument flies in the face of, 
and seriously distorts, the record in this case. 
The parties are in agreement that in his decision Judge Jenkins ruled all of the 
steelworkers were terminated by USX as of August 31,1987 when USX sold Geneva and 
that their rights to benefits had to be determined as if they had remained active employees 
who were terminated at that time. [See Defs' memo, in support of motion to strike Chilton 
motion at 17.] in turn, Section 12A.3 of the BLA provided that: 
An employee even though otherwise eligible under this Subsection A, 
forfeits the right to vacation benefits under this Section if he quits, retires, 
dies, or fe discharged prior to January 1 of the vacation year. [Emphasis 
added] 
12 
The sole argument asserted by Counsel for summary judgment on the vacation pay 
claim was that because Judge Jenkins ruled all employees were lawfully terminated as of 
August 31,1987, they were not entitled to 1988 vacation pay under Section 12A.3 as they 
had been terminated, or the in the language of Section 12A.3 "discharged", prior to 
January 1,1988. [Attached hereto as Exhibit C is an excerpt of the relevant pages of 
Counsel's memorandum in support of the first motion for summary judgment.] This is 
the precise basis upon which Judge Brian granted summary judgment on the 
vacation pay claim. 
In their opposition memorandum and at oral argument, the HJS Plaintiffs did not 
say a word about any supposed difference between "termination" and "discharge" or raise 
in any fashion their new argument that although the steelworkers were "terminated55, they 
were not "discharged". Instead, the HJS Plaintiffs tacitly acknowledged that on its face 
Section 12A.3 of the BLA barred their 1988 vacation pay claim, but argued that Section 
12A.3 was amended by Appendix R and Appendix QII to the BLA. [An excerpt of the 
relevant pages of the HJS Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the first summary 
judgment motion is attached hereto as Exhibit D.] 
Appendix R entitled '"Letter Agreement on 1987 Vacation Eligibility" only related 
to 1987 vacation eligibility, did not in any way affect the requirements of Section 12A.3 
of the BLA and had no bearing whatsoever on 1988 vacation pay, as Judge Brian 
correctly determined. [See Judge Brian's 9/22/05 Decision at 10-11.] Appendix QII to the 
13 
Exhibit L 
Defendant Young's Settlement Summary for Bill Wright 
S^ei^CTt STOinary for Ml Wrfgfc 
Sign in front of a witness and return on or before Fcbruaty 26,1996f only if it is correct. 
Your Second Payment Gross Amount is $17,978.00* (before taxes and attorney's fees). 
By looking at the page four Chart entitled Final Gross Payout by Group, you can determine your 
category. You can also see how the two payments combined total the amount promised in our meetings and 
m the release agreements. The total amount received was increased by the return of any costs you paid and 
it may be increased ifyou received an award ^ ^ 
by your attorney's fees of 33 1/3%, unpaid costs and the hearings fees charge, if any. Also, some taxes 
(usually not enough) have been and will be withheld fiom your gross installment checks by USX. The 
following paragraphs detail your upcoming check: 
Calculation of Second Installment Check (before taxes): 
Second Payment Gross Amount: 
Less Unpaid Costs ($1,100 - Costs paid): 
Less Atty's Fees (1/3 of Gross -.Unpd Costs): 
Less Attorney's Fee on Pension* 
Less Hearings Fee (if applicable) 
Total costs 
Add Hearings Amount (if any)A + 
Ltss Atiy's Fee on Hearing Amt (1/3 of Amt)-: 
Hearing Amount subtotal 
$17,978.00 
SdOO 
$17,978.00 
$11,98533 
$0.00 
$100,00 
$100.00 
$7,411.93 
$2,437.31 
$4,974.62 
$11,98533 
$10Q.QP 
$11,885.33 
$4,974.62 
Gross Check Amount to You (before Taxes) $16,859.95* 
I, Bill Wright, do hereby accept and understand the breakdown set forth above and that. my share 
of the final settlement proceeds arising fiom Pickering v. U.SX and related cases is $16,859.95.^  I ask that 
my check be mailed to fee-address above on or about March 4,1996, and I do hereby acknowledge that the 
figures above are correct, and I do hereby release my attorneys from any claim relating to the settlement 
SIGNED and DATED this > P - day of J3^*A 
Address <X73 5o ^ A / 
Ays*** ft7i^7 
_, 1996. 
Bill.Wright 
SocSec#: 
Witnessed by: ^Jafaorx/. ltness namenrinte^/^^y//^ Z. fofyf*f/}7~~ 
V 
#We reserve the right to collect additional attorney's fees on any definable benefit as a result of increased pension rights 
received as a result of the Pfckermg lirigatiQiu 
* We reserve the right to change this number if a significant calculation error or category error is made, only after notice 
to and a meeting with the client 
AA copy of Judge Daniel's brief ruling about your individual case, and the case in general, Is available upon request. 
3 
FTNAL GROSS PAYOUT BY GROUP 
Plaintiff Groups 
AH payments are before taxes and attorneys1 fees J 
Idling Plaintiffs: (1320) Those Union represented plainlifB and 
aon-Exempt, ijon-represenWd pta£nt|jf& who ivere not recalled to w?rk at 
USX on or after February 1,1987, btii -who were actively employed Just 
prior to the work stoppage on July 3I,1986. 
Recalled Idling Plaintiffs: (54) Those Union represented 
I phmUfisTdto wtreTtcallcd to ]cecp the pjao ton "hot idle oner aflcr 
J Febnrary 1,1987, * , J 
J Managers: (44) ManagemcotplaiotiJ&whowertt recalled or were 
working on or after/February 1,1987, 
( Laid O f f Managers: (17 ) Management plaintiffs wbo Verc laid off 
I prior to July 31,19H6 and who "were not recalled to work on or after 
J February 1,1987, 
Recall Plaintiffs: (214) Union represented plalmlift who were bid 
off prior to July 31,19B6 and who were -not recalled lo work on or after 
j February 1,1987. 
[ - '
 t ' * - • • 
1 LaRoche:(28) Union representatives who -were sold to LaRocbe 
| Industries in May, 1986. 
1st Payment | 
Sept 1995 
$10,475.00 1 
$4,744.00 
$4,744.00 
$13,045.00 
$11,752.00 
1 $4,744.00 
2nd Payment 
Mar. 1996 
$16,025.00 | 
$7,256.00 1 
$7,256.00 
' $19,955.00 
[$17,978.00 
1 $7,256.00 
Gross Amount Awarded $47,000,000.00 
Costs $ 1.805.731.00 
Nettobe divided $45,194,269.00 
Fees $45,194,269.00 
Calculation djvrded by 3 
[ Attorneys Fees= ' $15,064,756.33® 
Total Payment per 
Plaintiff •Before (axes and 
attorney's fees ' | 
$16,500.00° 1 
$12^600.00* 
$12,000.00® J 
$33,000.00° 
$29,730.00° 
1 $12,000.00® 
j Subtotal 
j Costs 
J Hearings Awards 
j Minus'Cost Charge® 
1 Total 
Total Amount * 
$34,980,000.00 1 
ll_L«l I 
$648,000.00 
$528,000.00 
.$561,000.00 
$6,362,220.00 
$336,000.00 
| 543,415,220.00* j 
$ J,805,731.00 
1 $ 2,349,332.28* ] 
$ 570,283.28 H 
j $47,000,000.00 J 
® Amounts may be increased by pension payments and hearings proceeds. 
© Attorney's Fees were taken from tliese amounts minus the cost chargqs only (See calculation above), 
@* The Cost Charge came from amounts Subtracted from clients who didmot pay their costs. This sum was distributed by Judge Daniels as 
partaf.the hearings proceeds- \ • 
® Fees were divided between Yoijng & Kester, Spence, Moriarity & Schuster, Ptotkm & Jacobs, Lynn C. Harris, Doug Baxter, Vickie 
Rinne, Michael Goldsitiith, Bill Corbet and Howard Egleft 
efendant Young's Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs 
Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs 
Settlement 
$36/072.00 
0.53 x 
$19,118.00 
$ 1,500.00 
& 1.500.00 
$16,118.00 
1.644 x 
$26,500.00 
Average Wage for years 1984-198£ 
194/365 days (percentage) x 
Average Lost Wage (Gross) 
Deductions:. Wages Paid (2/16-8/31/87) 
Sub (2/16-8/31/87) 
Total Gross Wage Loss 
Compound Interest x 
T o t a l D a m a g e s (Inch l i t &Afcty's Fees) 
Plaintiff 
$_, 
0,53 
$ 
$ 
£ 
$ 
1,644 
If your calculations exceed $26,500.00 then yon should probably 
request a hearing. If your calculations do not exceed $26,500.00 you 
may still request a hearing if you haye special facts or circumstances 
which may entitle you to additional money from the surplus fund. 
D0O0002 
Total Gross Pavnnt fry f?Tmip 
Everyone will be repaid up to $1,100.00 based upon what costs each plaintiff paid in addition to the payments listed below. 
Plaintiff Groups 
All payments are before taxes and attorney's fees 
1 ': 
J •- * ? ! 
I d l i n g P l a i n t i f f s : ( 1 3 1 6 ) Those Umon presented plaintiffs, 
1 and non-Exerapt, non-rcprescntcd plalntifBs who were not recalled to 
J work at USX on or after February 1,19*87, but who were actively 
j employed just prior to the work stoppage on July 31,1986. 
R e c a l l e d I d l i n g P l a i n t i f f e : ( 5 5 ) Those Union represented 
j * plaintiffs who were recalled to keep the plant on hot idle on or after j 
February 1,1987,- ! 
M a n a g e r s : ( 5 0 ) Management plaintiff who were recalled or 
were working on or after February 1,1987. 
L a i d O f f M a n a g e r s : ( 1 4 ) Management plaintiS who were 
j laid off prior to December 31, 1986 and not recalled to work on oV 
j after February 1,1987. 
R e c a l l P l a i n t i f f s : ( 2 1 1 ) Union represented plaintiffs who
 x 
f were laid off prior to July 31,1986 and who were not recalled to work 
J on or after February J*, 1987. 
L a R o c b e i ( 2 8 ) Union represented plaintifis who were sold to 
LaRoch.c Industries in May, 1986. 
1st Pajtaent 
Aug/Sept; 1995 | 
$10,475.00 | 
$4,744.00 
$4,744,00 
$13,045.00 
$11,752.00 
$4,744.00 
2nd Payment 
Feb/Mar, 1996 
$16,075.00 1 
$7,256.00 
$7,256.00 
! $19,955.00 
$17,978.00 
i $7,256.00 
*Tfctese amounts may be increased by pension 
payments and hearings proceeds if applicable. 
Total Payment per 
Plaintiff *Before taxes 
and attorney's fees 
$26,500.00* 1 
$12,000.00* 
$12,000.00* 
$33,000.00* 
! $29,730.00* 
1 $12,000.00* 
Subtotal 
Costs 
Reserve 
1 Total 
Total Amount 
$34,874,000.00 
$ 660,000.00 1 
$ 600,000.00 I 
$ 462,000.00 1 
$ 6,273,030.00 1 
$ 336,000.00 1 
1 $43,205,030.00 1 
| $ 1,841,400.00 | 
| $ 1,453,570.00** 
| $46,500,000.00** 
, ? •* . . >...' 
** Amounts "will be Increased by $500,000*00 if all claims are resolved by the date of tbe "second payment. 
Exhibit G 
Defendant Young's Hearing Worksheet for Idling Plaintiffs 
Hearing Worksheet for Tdlitig PTa-mffffc 
Settlement 
S36.072.00 
0.53 x 
$19,118.00 
$ 1,500.00 
& 1.500.00 
$16,118.00 
1.644 x 
$26,500.00 
Average Wage for years 1984-198$. 
194/365 days (percentage) x 
Average Lost Wage (Gross) 
Deductions:. Wages Paid (2/2 6-8/31/87) 
Sub (2/16-8/31/87) 
Total Gross Wage Loss 
Compound Interest x 
Total Damages (intuxkt&Atty'sFtts) 
Plaintiff 
$ . . . 
0-53 
$ 
$ 
1 
$ 
1.644 
If your calculations exceed $26,500.00 then you should probably 
request a hearing. If your calculations do not exceed $26,500-00 you 
may still request a hearing if you haye special facts or circumstances 
which may entitle you to additional money from the surplus fund. 
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Exhibit M 
In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County 
West Jordan Department, State of Utah 
(ZhiLTerL .&t-*J/ 1 
Plaintiff, ! SUBPOENA 
vs. 
/ (T Defendant c^*.Q3Q\Q^g87 
To: £T\/f A/ SCO Mi/T?~ f-/;]/-J*JitiS0n~ Sob/mo?) 
YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
[ ] to appear in the Third District Court, West Jordan Department at 80B0 S. Redwood Rd., 
West Jordan, Utah on fee date and time specified below to testify in the above case. 
[ ] to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a 
deposition in the above case. 
t^g_produce/br permit inspection and copying of the following documents or objects at 
The place, date and time specified below (list documents or objects): / 
a// ft/<es Vcvr f&r/y*r £ It * ah P* i V/<? u To 4> roduc <*£-
PLACE '^wt'iT Xh-^nf 'y DATE Ata} TIME 
Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall 
designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to 
testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each person designated, the matters on which the 
person wffl testify. Rule 30(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
•^UIN^OgEflCWS SIGNATURE 
(check box below to indicate title) 
~jjrf~ Deputy Court/Clerk 
[>J &ttS®sy forTlainnff.- Pro -$~£-
[ j Attorney for Defendant 
n. O cl d 
DATE 
*The clerk shall issue a subpoe&a, signed but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall complete h before 
service. An attorney admitted to practice in tbe court in which the action is pending may also issue and sign a 
subpoena as an ofiBcer of the court Rule 45(aX3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Exhibit C 
Ronald J. Chilton's Subpoena demand for inspection of documents, December 4,2006, Page 1 & 2 
Subpoena December 4,2006 
Page 1 of2 
Dave Glazier Pro-Se Ronald J. Chilton Pro-Se 
939 East 1000 South 214 East 1350 North 
Springville, Utah 84663 Lehi. Utah.. 84043 
Telephone f80n885-2058 N/A 
INTHE 4T H DISTRICT COURT. PROVO. STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
Pickering 
V 
U.S.X. SUBPOENA 
Civil 87-C-838J 88-C-763J 91-C-636J 
To: Allen K. Young 
Address: 75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 
YOU ARE COMMANDED. To produce or permit inspection and copying 
of the following documents at the place and date and time specified below: 
The four boxes of Dr. Paul Randall exhibits, that you removed from the 
Federal Court, in SX.C. and all other document concerning: 
Pickering/U.S.X. consolidated case Civil # 87-C-838J, Civil # 88-C-763J, 
Civil # 91-C-636J. 
These files are needed in case # 030105887 Chilton /Young 
3rd District Court Salt Lake County. State of Utah West Jordan Department 
If necessary we would be happy to come to your office within the next 14 
days, at your earliest convenience to inspect or copy this information. 
Subpoena Page-2-of2 
December 4,2006 
Thank you: 
ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNAHJRE AND TITLE 
{INDICATE IF ATTORNEYFOR PLAINTIFF OR DEFEND. 
In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County 
West Jordan Department, State of Utah 
Plaintiff; 
VS. 
/ </ Defendant 
SUBPOENA 
Case No. 
To: _ i ) 4,m<"> *H*$KfH$ 
YOU ARE COMMANDED: 
to appear in the Third District Court, West Jordan Department at S080 S. Redwood Rd., 
West Jordan, Utah on the date and time specified below to testify in the above case, 
to appear at the place, date and time specified below to testify at the taking of a 
djpositianm the above case. 
ftoprd3Sc£tor permit inspection and copying of the folio-wing documents or objects at 
tne_place, date and time specified below (list documents or objects): 
I 3 
[ 3 
PLACE ly^-z&Sl/ Co rtf^ T° / < W Shh/ <>o f t f DATE AND , 
Any organization not a party to tms suit thai is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition shall 
designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or other person who consent to 
testify on its behalf, and may set forth, tor each person designated, the matters on which the 
person will testify. Rule 30(bX6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. /} ("c, K T h* ht Is & 
r^J L ^ MAR 0 3 2008 
5^/vv-* 
*issuiNq^j 
(check box Below to 
-Jrf— Deputy Coi 
IGNATURE 
title) DATE 
[><j AtesBa^forPteintiff ftc^s^ *>* 
[ ] Attorney for Defendant f ft <? *j ~t ~ 
•'Has clerk shall issue a subpoena* signed but otherwise in biank, to a party requesting it, who shall complete it before 
service. An attorney admitted ID practice in the court in which tne action is pending may also issue and sign a 
subpoena as an officer of the court Rule 45(a)(3) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6<?7-f22Z-
Exhibit N 
. .:S!F»iCl COUS'.i 
06JUH30 AH I h 52 
._o, ' JORDAN DEPT 
Evan A. Schmutz (3860) 
Theodore F. Linn (8234) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Jamestown Square, Suite 200 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone (801) 375-6600 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD J. CHILTON, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ALLEN K. YOUNG; YOUNG, KESTER & 
PETRO; GERRY L. SPENCE; LYNN C. 
HARRIS; SPENCE, MORIARTY & 
SCHUSTER; JONAH ORLOFSKY; 
PLOTKIN & JACOBS and John Does I - V, 
individuals whose true identity is unknown to 
the Plaintiffs, 
Defendants. 
Evan A. Schmutz and the law firm of Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C. hereby give 
notice of their withdrawal as counsel for Plaintiff Ronald Chilton. There are no motions 
pending and no trial date has been set. The last known address of the Plaintiff is: 
Ronald Chilton 
214 E. 1350 No. 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
OF COUNSEL 
Civil No. 030105887 
Judge Stephen Roth 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant was mailed first class on to the following: 
Burbidge & Mitchell 
215 S. State Street 
Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone:(801)355-6677 
Julie- r j 
\10 S. /V\ii«/Suite 4DO 
Sa\T L*De CCi V UT, 2H\0) 
_, 2008 
Michael 5Koi.«)ck 
16 EKchocngcJfUae Sditc %o 
SaiT Lake 0)11, UTAII $HUl 
VhbHe Cftl) 5*/ -3773 
Ronald Chiltor/PlaintifTin Pro Se 
Designated foHhe Plaintiffs 
P^t/T^T L . GJJ pi^jw'j'ff ,A; Pre 
p*SHjHa.l*J f-oir%e PlciiNl'iffS 
51-50 
